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JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
* COPYRioHT 1993 By NEW YoRK LAW S HOOL
VOLUME X SPRING 1993 PART Two
UNITED STATES HAITIAN POLICY:
A HISTORY OF DISCRIMINATION
Cheryl Little'
"Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe fee;
the wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these, the homeless, tempest-
tost to me, I lift my lamp beside the golden door.'1
I. Introduction
While the United States has long been perceived as a mecca
for refugees from all over the world, this is rapidly changing as many
more refugees wish to come to the United States than this country
safely feels it can admit. Poor economic conditions in the United
States have increased the general public's concern with the large
number of aliens who are legally being admitted into this country
every year. This concern of late has focused on those persons fleeing
from Haiti to the United States.
The first boatload of Haitians claiming persecution in Haiti
Attorney, Florida Rural Legal Services, Miami, Florida; Coordinator of
Guantanamo asylum cases in Florida; Chair, American Immigration Lawyers Association
Haitian Task Force; Directing Attorney, Haitian Refugee Center, 1987-1992; B.S.,
Florida International University, 1982; J.D., University of Miami School of Law, 1985.
1 EMA LAzARus, THE NEw CoLOssus 1 (1883).
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arrived in the United States in September 1963.2 Out of the twenty-
five refugees in this group, all were denied political asylum and
deported.3 In retrospect, this signaled the wave of rejection that was
to come.4 Despite the well-documented political oppression in Haiti
over the past two decades, refugees from Haiti, the world's first
Black Republic,5 have been singled out for special discriminatory
treatment. The fundamental principles of refugee protection have
been abandoned time and again in favor of returning Haitians to a
country where its people are routinely victimized.
I. United States Immigration Legislation
In 1965, Congress discarded favoritism by national origins in
favor of the same immigration ceiling for every country.' In October
1968, the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
was ratified by the United States Senate.7 The amended Protocol
2 Cheryl Tompkin, A Criminal at the Gate: A Case for the Haitian Refugee, 7 BLACK
L.J. 387, 387 (1983).
3 1d.
4 Haitians began entering the United States in significant numbers by plane in 1957,
when Francois Duvalier ruled Haiti and terrorized the people with his dreaded Tonton
Macoutes, a powerful paramilitary political force created by Duvalier. Tens of
thousands of upper and middle class Haitians, mostly small businessmen and
professionals, arrived in the United States in the 1960s and early 1970s on nonimmigrant
visas. Distinguishable only because of their special tales of oppression and terror, these
Haitians were rarely deported, although none were officially regarded as refugees. It
was not until the mid to late 1970s that Haiti's rural and urban poor migrants took to
their boats in any significant number and came to this country. Between 1980, when the
U.S. government briefly relaxed its immigration policy, and September 1981, when the
Haitian interdiction policy began, hundreds of boats loaded with Haitian refugees landed
in South Florida. See Anemona Hartocollis, Battling Ethnic, Racial Tags, NEWSDAY,
June 25, 1990, at 7.
s A successful slave revolt from the French in 1804 made Haiti the first independent
country in Latin America and the first state in the world established through the revolt
of slaves. Id.
See Reena Shah, Immigration Law Sends New Signal, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec.
24, 1990, at IA.
' Linda Greenhouse, Court Rules Narrowly in an Immigration Case, N.Y. TIMES,
June 6, 1984, at A23. "Exactly why the United States acceded to the Protocol is far from
clear. The sparse legislative history suggests that it was primarily a symbolic gesture,
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denied a State the right to expel a refugee' if his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his political opinion, race,
religion, nationality, or membership in a particular social group.9
Equal treatment was further extended in 1980 when the
Untied States redefined refugees as individuals fearing persecution not
only from communist systems, as had been the case before, but from
any regime.10 The Refugee Act of 1980 was meant to bring United
States law into conformity with international treaty obligations and to
establish a permanent, systematic procedure for meeting the
humanitarian needs of refugees and those seeking asylum in the
United States.'
a manifestation of solidarity with the United Nation's humanitarian mission timed to
coincide with the International Year for Human Rights, which the U.S. and the U.N. had
both proclaimed." See GILD. LOEScHm& JoNNA. SCANLON, CALCULATED KINDNESS:
RUEAND AM CA'S HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945 TO THE PRESENr 83 (1986); J. Michael
Cavoise, Note, Defending the Golden Door: The Persistence of Ad Hoc and Ideological
Decision Making in U.S. Refugee Law, 67 IND. L.J. 411, 422 (1992).
1 Refugees are a special sort of migrant because they stand outside the quota system,
and because their chief qualification for admission into this country by definition is
unrelated to their economic utility. The government has the unique ability to select
refugees. U.S. law recognizes two types of refugees, with the distinction being how
these individuals gained admittance into this country. The first type of refugees are
interviewed abroad, either in a country that is providing them temporary asylum (a
country of "first" asylum) or their country before they fled anywhere. The second
group, known as asylum seekers, enter the United States in some fashion (legally with
a visa or illegally) and then apply for political asylum. Each year, the President, after
consulting with Congress, decides on a ceiling, a maximum number of refugees (not
including asylum seekers) who will be admitted. Robert Pear, Bush Seeks Slight
Increase in Number of Refugees, N.Y. TMES, Sept. 12, 1989, at A12. See also John
Scanlon, bmigration Law and the Illusion of Nwnerical Control, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV.
819, 846 (1982).
9 See David M. Margolick, Suit by Six Haitian Aliens Testing Detention Policy, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 1981, at Bi. This international treaty provided more protection to the
refugee than did the Immigration Act since it extended protection to "excludable" as well
as "deportable" aliens and since it made asylum a right, rather than a matter in the
Attorney General's discretion. "Deportable" aliens have been expelled after entering the
United States, whereas "excludable" aliens have been denied initial entry into the United
States. The irony is that "deportable aliens," many of whom entered the country
surreptitiously, have been given more rights under the law than "excludable" aliens who
present themselves to immigration. Virtually all of the Haitians fleeing their country by
boat or arriving by plane at the airport are "excludable" aliens.
o Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
" See id.
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Yet the new laws have not afforded the Haitians any
meaningful relief; rather they have betrayed the very people they
were meant to protect. In spite of the Refugee Act's attempt to
establish objective criteria for determining refugee admissions and de-
politicize refugee policy, the Act's provisions are easily circumvented
by an executive branch with too much discretionary authority. The
Act therefore creates the appearance of formal legal standards in the
refugee admissions process, while diverting attention from the vast
number of refugees who are admitted on a nonformal and nonlegal
basis in furtherance of United States political objectives."2 Indeed,
less than five percent of the refugee admissions in recent years have
come from noncommunist areas such as Haiti.13
The Haitians' quest for political asylum perhaps best
illustrates the continuing bias in the implementation of United States
immigration laws. Fewer than sixty Haitians were granted asylum
between 1980 and 1991.14 Despite the bloody outcome of the aborted
election in Haiti in 1987, not a single Haitian was granted asylum that
year." In 1990, only two percent of Haitians whose cases were
decided by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) were
approved, giving Haitians the lowest rate of asylum approval of any
nationality.16 Even these figures are generous to the INS, since a
2 The year 1992 saw an approval rate of only 37% in United States asylum cases,
compared to a rate of about 70% in Canada. Deborah Sontag, 4ystem for Political
Asylum is Improving, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1992, at A12. From June 1983 until March
1991, 74.5% of refugees from the former Soviet Union were granted asylum to the
United States compared to 1.8% Haitians, 2.8% Salvadorans, and 2.0% Guatemalans.
Id.
13 From 1981 until 1989, 94.4% of refugees admitted were from communist
countries. With the addition of Iran and Iraq, the total reached 99.9%. See Voting With
Their Feet, Their Trabants and Their Oars, THE EcONOMiST, Dec. 23, 1989, at 17. The
asylum and parole process continues to purposefully divert persons from communist
countries from the legal system, thereby ensuring that they will be admitted irrespective
of the validity of their individual claims.
4 While roughly 2400 Haitian asylum applications were filed and processed between
1980-1991, only fifty-two Haitians were granted asylum, less than two percent.
Immigration and Refugees, Hearings Before the House of Representatives Subcommittee
on International Law, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., (Nov. 20, 1991) (statement of Arthur C.
Helton, Director, Refugee Project, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights).
Is Jacquelyn Swearingen, Home Leader to Fight 'Harsh' Haitian Policy, MIAMI
HERALD, June 9, 1989, at 4B.
" Refugees Two Types of Treatment, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 7, 1993, at 21A.
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number of other Haitians who would have been in the program
decided to opt out and forgo applying for asylum because the odds
were so great against their claims being fairly considered. 17
III. Haitian Immigration and the United States Courts
Haitian refugee advocates were forced to turn to the courts in
attempting to put an end to the discriminatory practices of the United
States government toward the Haitians."8 Two landmark cases were
brought in the 1980s. The first, Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti,"9
was filed in July 1980 on behalf of over 4000 Haitians requesting
political asylum. The INS, through procedures in effect at that time,
had denied the more than 4000 claims.2'
Indeed, the INS had adopted a special "Haitian Program" in
1978, designed specifically to adjudicate, and to deny, as quickly as
possible the asylum claims of Haitians.21 This was the result of an
,7 Symposium, Conference on International Human Rights Law in State and Federal
Courts, 17 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 49 (1982).
" During the 1960s and early 1970s, an almost impossible burden of proof was
placed on Haitians seeking asylum. Two major class action cases challenged this policy.
In Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1977), it was decided that excludable
aliens, such as the Haitians, who had not made an "entry" into the United States, neither
enjoyed the protection of the U.S. Constitution, nor were vested with any substantive
rights by the ratified Protocol period. Id. at 1287. Justification for this ruling, which
constituted a major stumbling block for Haitians seeking relief, was weak: "Clearly
constitutional protections cannot be afforded to the entire population of the world, and
some distinction is necessary." Id. at 1290. The court in Sannon v. United States, 460
F. Supp. 458 (S.D. Fla. 1978), held the opposite result from Pierre. Both cases became
moot when the INS promulgated a new rule which provided for an evidentiary hearing
of asylum claims in exclusion proceedings. Id. at 459. Even though the courts never
settled the issue, these were significant cases in which the Haitians were able, through
the judicial process, to force the INS to change its procedures in regard to exclusionary
hearings.
9 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), modified sub. nom. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v.
Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
20 Smith, 676 F.2d at 1032.
21 One court noted:
inhere was a program at work within INS to expel Haitians. Their
asylum claims were prejudged, their rights to a hearing given second
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"intentional" effort by United States government agencies to single
out the Haitians for special discriminatory treatment. 22
Rushed hearings, insufficient consideration of claims, and
failure to allow the Haitians' attorneys time to properly assist their
clients, all culminated in a program which "in its planning and
executing [was] offensive to every notion of constitutional due
process and equal protection."' As the Civiletti court concluded:
Those Haitians who came to the United States seeking
freedom and justice did not find it. Instead, they
were confronted with an Immigration and
Naturalization Service determined to deport them...
A Program was set up to accomplish this goal.
The Program resulted in wholesale violations of due
priority to the need for accelerated processing .... The violations
[of due process] were discriminatory acts, part of a Program to expel
Haitians.... The [INS] did not grant a single request for asylum
... . During that time, thousands of Haitians were processed.
These denials were not case-by-case adjudication, but an intentional,
class-wide summary denial.
Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. at 519.
1 An examination of State Department and INS records unequivocally confirmed that
the Justice Department, INS, and the State Department had embarked on a plainly illegal
program to deport Haitian boat people from the United States. This was done in
violation of fundamental rights provided by U.S. and international law. Peter A. Schey,
The Black Boat People, 9 MIaRATION TODAY 7, 9 (1981).
23Civilefti, 503 F. Supp. at 532. Immigration judges refused to suspend the
deportation hearings of Haitians who sought asylum, although judges had customarily
granted suspensions before the initiation of the Haitian Program. The Haitians therefore
were forced to admit their deportability before they could seek asylum. Immigration
judges also infringed upon Haitians' Fifth Amendment right to remain silent by inferring
an admission of deportability from their assertion of that right. And, acting without
authority, they gave Haitians as little as ten days to file their asylum claims or have their
claims dismissed for lack of prosecution. Such deadlines made adequate preparation of
Haitian asylum claims impossible. The short length of the interviews, as well as the lack
of knowledge of the interviewers, caused the decisions denying asylum to be based upon
insufficient information. The use of form letter denials and the State Department's
failure to fairly evaluate claims further deprived Haitians of a fair chance to seek
asylum. Id. at 522, 532; Snith, 676 F.2d at 1031.
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process, and only Haitians were affected.'
Moreover, the court found that the discriminatory treatment of
Haitians was nothing new: "The court is . .. presented with a
pattern of discrimination which began... in 1964. Over the past 17
years' Haitian claims for asylum and refuge have been systematically
denied, while all others have been granted. The recent Haitian
Program is but the largest-scale, most dramatic example of that
pattern. ,,O
Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. at 532. The Appeals Court made an interesting observation
in regard to the tremendous backlog of cases that had accumulated in the INS Miami
District office by the summer of 1978 (between 6000 and 7000 cases). The court
claimed this backlog - which the government had argued constituted the reasons for
instigating the Haitian Program - was not a result of a massive influx of Haitians to
South Florida over a short period, but rather was primarily attributable to a slow trickle
of Haitians over a ten-year period and to the confessed inaction of the INS in dealing
with these aliens. Moreover, the court noted that INS Deputy Commissioner Noto, who
visited the Miami office in August 1978, encouraged attorneys to point out "THE
DIMENSIONS OF THE HAITIAN THREAT" and that "these are unusual cases dealing
with individuals that are threatening the community's well-being - socially and
economically." Smith, 676 F.2d at 1030 (quoting Plaintiffs' Exhibit 100 at 5).
1 Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. at 519. The trial in this case lasted about one month and
approximately 55 witnesses testified for the Haitians. Deportation hearings were
processed at an unprecedented rate under the Haitian Program. Previously, only
between one and ten hearings were conducted each day. During the program, three
immigration judges held an average of 55 hearings a day. At the program's peak, the
number of deportation hearings increased to as many as 80 a day. Only about 13
lawyers were available to represent all of the Haitians. Because of-the number of
Haitians undergoing processing, and the speed with which the processing advanced,
attorneys were not provided sufficient time to prepare the cases. Adequate preparation
of a Form 1-598 (the form used to request asylum) requires between at least 10 to 40
hours of an attorney's time, often even more. During the period of the Haitian program,
if each of the attorneys available to represent the Haitians did nothing during a 40 hour
week except prepare Forms 1-589, they would have been able to devote only about two
hours to each client. Because of other demands on their time, however, the attorneys
could not even spend all of their time on these applications. Asylum interviews were
also being held in the INS district office at the rate of 40 per day. Immigration officers
who formerly had worked at the airport were enlisted as hearing officers for those
interviews. Prior to the program such interviews lasted up to an hour and a half; during
the program the officers spent approximately 30 minutes interviewing each Haitian. As
communication had to occur through Creole interpreters, only about 15 minutes of
substantive dialogue actually took place. Hearings on asylum requests were conducted
simultaneously at several different locations. It was not unusual for the few attorneys
available to represent Haitians to have three hearings scheduled at the same hour in
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The district court judge in Civiletti, Judge James Lawrence
King, noted that persons deported from the United States back to
Haiti faced a "substantial danger" of imprisonment, torture, or death
upon return and he suggested that the uniform rejection of the
Haitians' asylum claims demonstrated a profound ignorance, if not an
intentional disregard, of the conditions in Haiti.26 Additionally, Judge
King noted that Haiti's economic problems "are the manifestations of
oppression" and that the economic stagnation in Haiti was
"demonstrably an outgrowth of Duvalier politics."27  Many
economists who have studied conditions in Haiti have so concluded,
as have United States government studies.28
Despite the federal court's absolute condemnation of the
different buildings. While lawyers provided representation in one venue, Haitian clients
were denied refugee protection or ordered deported in others. According to the United
Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), which sent representatives to Miami
during the mass processing period, only 45% of all Haitian asylum applicants even had
interviews before their claims were denied. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. at 522; Smith, 676
F.2d at 1031.
Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. at 482.
I ld. at 508.
For example, a report issued by the Library of Congress concludes that the causes
of Haiti's poverty are interwoven with its political problems, and particularly the
oppressive rule of the Duvalier dynasty. Karen DeYoung, Doubling of U.S. Aid to Haiti
Questioned, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 1978, at A12. As S.L. Bauchman, a editorial writer
with the San Jose Mercury News, recently wrote:
In Haiti, poverty is political repression. Haiti's rich minority
controls the vast majority of resources, and makes almost no effort
to distribute them more fairly with the grindingly poor majority.
State violence, as cruel and oppressive as anything practiced by
communist governments, has kept the poor poor, the rich rich, and
dissent down. Anyone who flees leaves not only a nation of
paupers, but also the repression of a political system that depends for
survival on keeping people poor. Proof is the boat people numbers.
During the nine months after the reformist Aristide was elected with
huge support from poor voters, the flow of Haitian boat people
heading for Florida dried up to a trickle. Haiti is an extreme case,
but it's not unique in using state power to repress the kind of
political dissent that could change the economic system. A new
definition of refugee is needed.
$.L. Bauchman, Post-Cold War, Who is a Refugee?, SAN JOSE MERCutRY NEws, Apr. 14,
1992, at 5B.
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United States government's Haitian policy in Civiletti, Haitians
continued to be dismissed solely as economic migrants and the
government continued to demonstrate its bias against the Haitians
through improper screening and arbitrary detention. In late May
1981, INS began to systematically detain Haitians entering the United
States pending a hearing and status determination.29 This was a
marked departure from the established policy of detaining only those
aliens determined likely to abscond or who posed a threat to national
security.3" Haitians suddenly found themselves detained at the Krome
detention facility in Miami, Florida, regardless of whether the INS
thought that they were likely to abscond or pose a public threat.
In July of 1981, the State of Florida brought an action against
the Federal Government due to the overcrowded conditions at
Krome.31 During litigation, the government promised that efforts
would be made to keep the population at Krome at or under 1000
people.32 In order to abide by this representation, the INS transferred
Haitians out of Krome whenever the population exceeded 1000. 33 In
July 1981, transfers occurred to other INS detention facilities
throughout the country. 4
Advocates for the Haitian refugees again turned to the courts
for help and again the courts blasted the INS' callous disregard for
the rights of Haitian refugees. One federal court characterized the
" In 1982, a federal district court ruled that the INS had violated the requirement
of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) by instituting the new detention rule without
a formal announcement, thereby precluding public discussion of the policy change by
concerned parties. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1982). The INS
thereafter published an interim rule in the July 1982 Federal Register formalizing the
toughened detention policy in effect to this day.
" In 1981 the INS revived the practice of detaining nondocumented migrants that had
ended when Ellis Island was officially closed in 1954. While this new policy was in
response to the influx of Cubans and Haitians to Florida, the Cubans were generally
detained for processing purposes only while the Haitians were indefinitely detained. This
new detention policy began about the same time as the Haitian interdiction program.
Memorandum from Ruth Ellen Wasem, Specialist in Social Legislation, to the House
Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration, and Refugees
4 (Nov. 15, 1991) (on file with the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights).
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transfers as, "a human shell game in which the arbitrary Immigration
and Naturalization Service has sought to scatter [Haitians] to locations
that, with the exception Of Brooklyn are all in desolate, remote,
hostile, culturally diverse areas, containing a paucity of available
legal support and few, if any, Creole interpreters. " 5
Despite the court's order that INS stop the transfers, illegal
transfers of Haitians to remote areas of the country continued. In
May 1989, a federal judge in Miami blocked the forced transfer of
dozens of Haitians, this time from Krome to Louisiana and Texas
during a "lock down" of the INS facility.3 6 The judge found that the
circumstances under which the transfers took place violated the
Haitians of their due process rights." The INS therefore agreed to
return all 146 Haitians to Miami."
11 Louis v. Meissner, 530 F. Supp. 924, 926 (S.D. Fla. 1981). The court, which
enjoined the INS transfer policy in effect at the time, found that INS had singled out
Haitians for transfers to detention facilities in remote locations in Kentucky, New York,
Texas, and West Virginia, where it was impossible for them to get legal help. Id. at
929-30.
3 The judge in Michel v. Milhoilan ordered the INS to give its detainees five days
notice before transferring them out of state to other facilities. The Haitians who had been
shipped to Louisiana had only been given a few hours notice of the move and had no
access to their attorneys before being shipped out, as Krome was "locked down" and
attorneys were not allowed in. Neither detainees nor their attorneys were allowed phone
contact prior to the move. The INS agreed in Michel to improve the telephone and
general communication systems at Krome to allow detainees better access to legal
representation. Michel v. Milhollan, No. 89-1040 (S.D. Fla. May 18, 1989).
' Id. Haitians transferred to remote areas of the country from Miami are routinely
woken in the middle of the night and put on a bus in shackles and chains. The bus trips
generally take two to three days. Officials in Louisiana and Texas have said they
thought the Haitians were "big drug dealers," given their manner of arrival. Haitians
have no access to telephones prior to transfers and often end up in local jails, along with
convicted felons. The author knows of one case in which one Haitian woman illegally
transferred to Louisiana in 1989 was so ill upon arrival there that she needed immediate
surgery. She was chained to her hospital bed. Several months later, the woman was
awarded political asylum.
38 Michel v. Milhollan, No. 89-1040 (S.D. Fla. May 18, 1989). The first cases that
dealt with the problems of detention centered around the efforts of the federal
government to provide adequate facilities for the more than 100,000 Cuban and Haitian
refugees who entered the country after April 1980. See, e.g., Marquez-Colon v.
Reagan, 668 F.2d 611 (Ist Cir. 1981); Commonwealth of P.R. v. Muskie, 507 F. Supp.
1035 (D.P.R. 1981); Colon v. Carter, 507 F. Supp. 1026 (D.P.R.), vacated, 633 F.2d
964 (Ist Cir. 1980). These cases came about shortly after the government, through
President Carter, designated Fort Allen, Puerto Rico as one of the holding centers for
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Inhumane transfers of large groups of Haitians continue to this
day.39 A lawsuit filed in January 1993' charged that the continued
transfer of Haitians to remote places where counsel was unavailable
to represent them and Creole translators unavailable, violates the
Haitians regulatory, statutory, and constitutional rights.41
The new detention policy that was instituted in 1981 was also
subject to a lawsuit on the basis that INS was employing tactics
against those Haitians detained at Krome to deprive them of their
right to pursue asylum claims.42 This suit, the second major lawsuit
filed on behalf of the Haitians in the 1980s, resulted in a finding that
the Haitians were "impacted to a greater degree by the new detention
policy than aliens of any other nationality . . . ."I Unlike other
aliens, the Haitians indefinitely detained at Krome were improperly
denied access to their attorneys, were subject to mass exclusion
hearings behind closed doors, were found excludable in hearings in
which translators failed to translate properly, and were deported in a
manner INS itself admitted was faulty.'
the refugees. The federal government ultimately agreed to operate Fort Allen in
compliance with a number of requirements contained in a consent agreement with the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Marquez-Colon, 668 F.2d at 616.
" In late 1992, the INS transferred over 130 Haitians to Laredo and Harlingen,
Texas, over 30 Haitians to Louisiana, and about 300 Haitians to county jails in North
Florida. Attorneys in these areas called upon INS to either release the Haitians or send
them to the Krome Detention Center in Miami because they could not communicate with
the Haitians and did not have the resources to effectively represent them. /NS Denies
Language Barrier Among Haitian Detainees, UPI, Dec. 16, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Omni File.
0 Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Barr, No. 93-0080 (S.D. Fla. filed Jan. 15, 1993). This
case is pending in the federal district court in Miami. As of this writing, it appears the
INS has agreed to bring the Haitians in North Florida to Miami for their hearings and
to allow attorneys in Miami adequate time to prepare the Haitians' cases.
"' While the INS is not required to house all illegal Haitians who arrive in Miami
at the INS facility there, those in INS custody must be given an opportunity to obtain
counsel. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1362 (West 1993).
42 Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
o Id. at 1000.
" Thirty Haitians at a time were ordered deported behind locked doors, while
attorneys were prevented from entering the rooms to inform them of their rights. INS
eventually admitted that the hearings were in fact faulty and dozens of cases were
remanded back to INS for new hearings. See Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.
Fla. 1982); Louis v. Meissner, 532 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Louis v. Meissner,
A--A
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The district judge in Louis v. Nelson, Eugene Spellman, held
that the new detention policy was discriminatory on its face and in its
application.4 He also found that the Fifth Amendment did apply to
excludable aliens such as Haitians." The detention policy was
therefore found to be invalid and the court ordered the release of over
1000 Haitians, provided they were deemed neither a security risk nor
likely to abscond.47 The court ensured that the Haitians would be
provided pro bono counsel to represent them.48
The government appealed the district court decision4 9 and on
April 12, 1983, Appeals Court Judge Kravitch, in a historic 136 page
decision, found that statistical evidence disclosed that the federal
government had engaged in a "stark pattern" of discrimination against
the Haitian asylum seekers in the United States." ° This was the first
time in the history of American law that the federal government was
found to discriminate on the basis of race or national origin under the
Constitution in a non-employment context.51
The government's claim in this case that there was a massive
influx of Haitians coming into the United States was rejected by the
530 F. Supp. 924 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 1003-04 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
Id. at 998. Louis was the first decision in American legal history where
excludable aliens, including those in detention, were found to be protected by the First
Amendment as well as the equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment, and it
was the first decision to find that excludable aliens must be informed of their right to
seek political asylum in the United States. Ira J. Kurzban, "Long and Perilous
Journey': The Nelson Decision, 11 HuM. RTs. 41, 43 (Summer 1983).
'7 Nelson, 544 F. Supp. at 1005-06.
48d. at 1004.
" The Haitians cross-appealed, after the government petitioned to stay the court's
order, on the ground that the judge erred in not finding that the federal government
intentionally discriminated against the Haitians in their incarceration policy. Jean v.
Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (lth Cir. 1983).
'o Id. at 1487. Time and again the federal courts have admonished the U.S.
government for their treatment of Haitian refugees. For over twenty years the
government has engaged in discriminatory acts against the Haitian refugees. Virtually
every issue raised by the Haitian Refugee Center in the lawsuit filed in January 1993 has
been raised in previous suits, and the INS and other governmental agencies were found
to have violated the law. See Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Barr, No. 93-0080 (S.D. Fla.
filed Jan. 15, 1993).
" Ira J. Kurzban, "Long and Perilous Journey": The Nelson Decision, 11 HuM.
RTS. 41, 42 (Summer 1983).
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Appeals Court, which noted that Haitians represented no more than
two percent of the illegal immigration flow into this country.' 2 The
force of the Louis decision has gone a long way to vindicate the claim
by the Haitian community and others that the federal government for
years engaged in a patently discriminatory policy against Haitians
seeking freedom in this country. 3
IV. Haitians Held at Detention Centers in the
United States are Denied Their Basic Rights
Haitians continue to languish in INS detention centers while
their cases for asylum are pending. According to INS officials, the
number of Haitians in United States detention centers has annually
ranged from a high of near 1800 during the 1980s to 400 as of
1993.' 4 The most well-known INS detention facility, Krome North
S2 Jean, 711 F.2d at 1493.
11 In 1988, a lawsuit was brought against the U.S. Government, challenging the
routine denial of farmworkers' applications, most of which were Haitian. Haitian
Refugee Ctr. v. Nelson, 694 F. Supp. 864 (S.D. Fla. 1988), aff'd, 872 F.2d 1555 (11th
Cir. 1989). Through discovery, attorneys for the Haitians learned that immigration
officials had developed a fraud profile which clearly singled out Haitians. Further, the
government engaged in the "largest, most ambitious fraud investigation undertaken by
the INS," formally charging mostly poor Haitian farmworkers of little education with
committing fraud in their applications for residency under the amnesty program
("Operation Cucumber"). See Immigration Charges Dropped, UPI, Apr. 21, 1988,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. The federal court judges hearing these
cases criticized the government for bringing the charges and the INS was forced to
dismiss all of the cases. Tina Montalvo, INS Amnesty Probe Falls Apart; All Cases
Dropped, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 21, 1988, § 3, at 1. See also Mark Kriegel & Linda
Robertson, Farm Worker Fraud Investigation Appears in Danger of Collapsing, MIAMI
HERALD, Apr. 5, 1988, at 8A. Miami immigration officials speaking to community
groups about Haitian migrants have been publicly criticized for their lack of sensitivity
in dealing with the Haitians. Dan Heating & Lizette Alvarez, Fory-five Haitians Make
Shore in North Key Largo, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 9, 1991, at lB. See also Tony Pugh,
INS Official's Remarks Offend Task Force, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 1, 1992, at 1B
(Broward).
54 Jane Sutton, Suit Accuses INS of Discriminating Against Haitians, UPI, Jan. 15,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File; Peter Slevin, No Rights for Aliens,
Court Rules, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 19, 1984, at 3.
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Service Processing Center (Krome), is located in Miami, Florida. 5
At any one time Krome's population includes detainees from
many different countries. During most of the time Krome has been
open, however, Haitians have constituted the largest national group,
comprising the majority of detainees. 6 Most Haitians, because they
were detained before having technically entered the country, have
been placed in exclusion proceedings and are held for months without
bond. 7
The prolonged detention of Haitians ultimately denies many
their day in court. Few detained Haitians even have basic knowledge
of their right to apply for asylum, and many are deported without
ever having seen an attorney." Barriers to communication with legal
representatives abound; many of these are conspicuously imposed by
the INS. 9 For example, efforts by Haitian refugee advocacy groups
to distribute legal materials to the Haitians have continually been
" The Krome North Service Processing Center is a minimum-security facility located
on the edge of the Everglades, west of Miami. It was opened as a temporary processing
center facility in 1980 to handle the influx of Cuban refugees of the Mariel boatlift and
Haitian boat refugees. It became a housing facility in 1981, when INS initiated a policy
of detaining of Haitian asylum seekers. Currently it is one of seven "service processing
centers" in the country run directly by INS. See generally Larry Rohter, 'Processing'
for Haitians is Tne in a Rural Prison, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1992, § 4, at 18.
I On March 20, 1991, Krome held 510 detainees, 306 of them Haitians. On April
22, 1991, Krome held 559 detainees, including 283 Haitians, 90 Cubans, and 58
Chinese. In early January 1993, according to an INS official in Miami, Haitians
comprised two thirds of the Krome population. Many Haitians have been detained at
Krome for a year or more. Despite the large Haitian population at Krome, only about
five percent of the personnel there speak Creole. See All Things Considered, Nat'l
Public Radio, Jan. 5, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
s' See Marvine Howe, Haitians Quietly Find Better Life in the City, Despite Their
Fears, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1984, at B1.
' Roughly 50 to 75 percent of Haitians at Krome are without legal representation.
See Cheryl Little, Haitians Stil Singled OutforDiscrimnination, MIAMI HE.ALD, Aug. 26,
1990, at 7F.
59 For those who remain at Krome, isolation from legal help is instrumental in their
deportation. Krome itself is on the opposite side of the county from Little Haiti and
inaccessible by public transportation. The time spent for an attorney traveling the 60
mile round trip and long waits - often hours - for prospective clients, is time lost from
representation. Few attorneys are able to undertake pro bono or reduced rate
representation under these circumstances.
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thwarted.' Similarly, the list that INS is required to provide
detainees of agencies that provide legal help is often not given to the
Haitians, 6 and when it is, it is so outdated as to be useless. 62
A lawsuit filed in January 1993 again challenged the INS'
o Haitian refugee advocacy groups have been prevented from giving lectures or
distributing guides in Creole advising the Haitians of their rights. They also cannot
distribute intake sheets to the Haitians to determine who qualifies for their assistance so
they can provide more timely assistance to the Haitians. This, combined with the lack
of a meaningful law library and the difficulty attorneys have in accessing their Haitian
clients by phone or in person, provides Haitian asylum seekers with little opportunity to
pursue legal remedies to which they are entitled. Arthur C. Helton, About Immigration;
It Was Better on Ellis Island, NEWSDAY, Sept. 14, 1990, at 66. On March 10, 1993, a
federal district court judge in Miami issued a Temporary Restraining Order against the
government, prohibiting them from denying Haitian Refugee Center lawyers from
making "know your rights" presentations and distributing written "know your rights"
materials to the Haitians at Krome. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Barr, No. 93-0080 (S.D.
Fla. filed Jan. 15, 1993). That case is pending.
"1 In Molaire v. Smith, 743 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Fla. 1990), U.S. District Court
Judge Eugene Spellman issued an opinion in the case of a Haitian asylum applicant, a
minor, who was not informed by the INS that free legal services were available. Judge
Spellman noted: "Repeatedly, this court and other federal courts have found that INS
has engaged in illegal practices and policies with respect to Haitians," and has singled
out Haitians for "special discriminatory treatment." Id. at 850.
62 The INS is not only required by its own regulations to provide to detainees lists
of agencies that provide free legal help, but specifically agreed to do so after being sued
in 1989. Michel v. Milhollan, No. 89-1040 (S.D. Fla. May 18, 1989). However, as
a human rights group recently found, the list continues to be meaningless:
Phone calls that were placed to all the organizations on that list
revealed, among other things, that of the 15 organizations listed,
only three provided any services to Krome detainees; and one of
these three could not accept collect calls (most phones at Krome are
for collect calls only). One office was listed three times, under
slightly modified names; one number belonged to a pregnancy
counseling service; one number had been disconnected; and one
person that was called said that she was insulted by the list because
organizations on it, including her own, were not capable of helping
Krome detainees. She said she had repeatedly made her concerns
known to the INS and requested that her organization be taken off
the list, with no results.
Prison Conditions in the United States, INS Detention, HUMAN RTS. REP. (Human Rights
Watch, New York, N.Y.), Nov. 1991. This issue was raised again with the federal
court in Haitian Refugee Center v. Barr. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Barr, No. 93-0080
(S.D. Fla. filed Jan. 15, 1993).
284 NYLS JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
arbitrary denial to Haitian refugee advocates of access to their
clients.6" The suit alleges that the INS continually engages in
practices designed to harass and intimidate lawyers representing
Haitians at Krome, attempts to undermine attorneys' credibility with
their clients, and prevents the detainees from being informed of their
legal rights.'
Over the past several years there have been many reports of
mistreatment of detainees at Krome, including verbal abuse, beatings,
sexual harassment, and arbitrarily imposed harsh disciplinary
measures. 65
The record speaks plainly: Haitians as a group, by
government admission, are afforded 'special'
treatment unlike any other class of prospective
refugees. Locked up and segregated from family or
friends, they have suffered mysterious maladies,
depression, suicidal urges. It's a damnable record for
a nation of freedom-loving immigrants.'
Since 1990, the facility of Krome has been under investigation
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Justice
63 Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Barr, No. 93-0080 (S.D. Fla. fied Jan. 15, 1993).
1 In their pleadings, attorneys for the Haitians point out that they are continually
forced to litigate the same issues over and over, because INS fails to obey court orders.
Attorneys for the Haitians stated: "In sum, the INS and Department of Justice have
thumbed their nose at the judiciary and have continued upon a course of illegal conduct
in the hope that plaintiff's resources are too meager, or their pro bono counsel too
exhausted to challenge them one more time. They are wrong." Haitian Refugee Ctr.
v. Barr, No. 93-0080 (S.D. Fla. filed Jan. 15, 1993).
6 See Larry Rohter, 'Processing'for Haitians is T"ime in a Rural Prison, N.Y.
TUMS, June 21, 1992, § 4, at 18; Cheryl Little, Haitians Still Singled Out For
Discrimination, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 26, 1990, at 7F. INS District Director Richard
Smith admitted in April 1990 that Krome was understaffed, the guards overworked, and
that nearly half of them were temporary employees who had received no formal training.
He said that the guards' pay is so low, it is "nearly impossible" to hire "the right type
of quality person." Official Says Detention Center Lacks Qualified Guards, UPI, Apr.
18, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. Between 1988 and 1990,
fifteen Krome guards were fired (roughly one-fifth of the guard population of the time),
six of them for abusive or aggressive behavior. Id.
IPulitzer Prize Awarded to Herald for Editorials on Haitian Refugees, MIAMI
HERALD, Apr. 19, 1983, at 1A (quoting a Miami Herald editorial).
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Department. 7 While officials suggested in March 1991 that the
investigation was completed, the Justice Department has indicated it
could take up to five years before a report issues. 68 To date, no
findings have been made public and the investigation has been used
by officials to limit access to independent civil rights groups.6
Haitian refugee advocates are most disturbed that despite the
glare of publicity and the FBI investigation, INS abuses of the
Haitians at Krome continue. 70  Certain of those in supervisory
'6 Over 200 written and videotaped statements of Krome detainees, ex-detainees,
former Krome employees, attorneys, and paralegals were collected by attorneys at the
Haitian Refugee Center in Miami between 1989 and early 1991, painting a picture of
cycles of humiliation and abuse directed in large part against the Haitians and more
recently, Chinese detainees, at the whim of certain guards. In the spring of 1990,
Florida RepresentativeDante Fascell, who headed the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
called for a FBI investigation, labelling the documentation of wrongdoing against
Haitians at Krome "disturbing and indicat[ing] that longstanding abuses at the center
remain uncorrected." Mary T. Schmich, Haitians Say Terror Rules Refugee Center,
Cm. TRIB., June 18, 1990, at 1. Less than a year later, a Haitian woman detained at
Krome was allegedly raped by a guard. She remained in detention for another two
months, claiming her attacker was still on the job, although the INS knew of her charges
shortly after the incident in question. Lizette Alvarez, Guard Accused of Rape, MIAMI
HERALD, Mar. 28, 1991, at lB. See also Jeanne DeQuine, Critics Describe INS Center
as a Bad 'Jail', USA TODAY, June 15, 1991, at 2A.
' INS' reaction to the public airing of allegations of abusive treatment to the
detainees in Krome was not encouraging. A teacher and a nurse who spoke to reporters
about abuses in Krome were subsequently dismissed. Another teacher was let go after
complaining to Miami INS officials about confiscation and disposal of Haitian detainees'
belongings, including books. The INS District Director in Miami at the time of the FBI
investigation said with respect to the allegations of abuse that "nothing has been done [at
Krome]... I haven't changed a thing." He claimed that until the FBI investigation was
formally completed, he was constrained from actually punishing the guards or changing
the system. Lizette Alvarez & Debbie Sontag, Krome Haunted by Claims ofAbuse; INS
Chief Charges are 'Outlandish', MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 28, 1991, at IA.
6 In November 1990, upon their arrival in Miami, the Minnesota Lawyers
International Human Rights Committee was denied permission by the INS to interview
detainees as part of an independent fact-finding mission at Krome, though permission had
been given the day before. Reporters and various other groups have likewise been
denied access to the detention center since the FBI investigation began. Lizette Alvarez,
Rights Group Criticizes Krome for Isolating Detainees, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 25, 1991,
at 4B.
" Two New York T"unes articles in June 1992 addressed the ongoing abuses directed
against the Haitians at Krome. It was reported that "[diuring a hunger strike ... to
protest the death of one such detainee, 185 Haitians interned at Krome charged that they
had been beaten, harassed and deprived of medical care, of their Bibles, and of contact
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positions at the INS detention facility appear insensitive to the abuses
against the Haitian detainees in their care.71 Unfortunately for the
Haitians, little at Krome has changed over the years.72
Under our law, it is not a crime to flee political repression.
Yet critics contend that conditions at Krome are inferior to those in
with their lawyers and relatives." Larry Rohter, 'Processing 'for Haitians is Tune in a
Rural Prison, N.Y. TMES, June 21, 1992, § 4, at 18. Krome guards allegedly justified
this treatment by telling the Haitians "you are all HIV-positive anyway .... ." Larry
Rohter, U.S. Accused of Abuse of Haitians at a Center, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1992, at
A10.
"' Mike Rozos, Krome's deputy administrator, had this to say about the detainees in
a 1991 interview: "This is not the crbme de Ia crbme. You have got scumbuckets
here." Jeanne DeQuine, Critics call for Closure of Immigration Center, USA TODAY,
June 14, 1991, at 6A. A report issued on Krome by a human rights group in 1991
concluded that "delegation members observed high-level INS officials making culturally
insensitive and racially derogatory remarks about the detainees and their home countries
while escorting the delegation around the facility. Other officials expressed hostility
toward detainees' attorneys." Hidden From View: Human Rights Conditions in the
Krome Detention Center, (Minnesota Int'l Lawyers Human Rights Comm., Minneapolis,
Minn.), Apr. 1991, at 50. Haitian refugee advocates have called for the establishment
of an independent oversight committee to review charges of inhumane treatment at
Krome. One of their concerns is that the Haitian detainees are not systematically
informed of INS grievance procedures and often fear retribution for lodging complaints.
See Larry Rohter, 'Processing'for Haitians is Tune in a Rural Prison, N.Y. ToIMs,
June 21, 1992, § 4, at 18.
I A major problem linking most INS abuses of power is the lack of accountability.
The Office of Inspector General (OIG), the arm of the Justice Department charged with
investigating abuse of authority by Justice Department authorities, has proved itself
unwilling to seriously investigate complaints of authority by INS officers. The OIG
lacks a complaint form, lacks a systematized procedure for informing the public of its
right to complain, does not provide notification of the status or disposition of complaints,
has a low ratio of investigators, lacks an appeals process for unsustained allegations, and
fails to compile and publish periodic statistics. A September 1990 Senate Subcommittee
report found a "disturbing pattern of wrongdoing" by inspector generals. Citing 15 case
studies in which they said inspector generals harassed whistle-blowers, failed to
investigate charges, or bent rules, Senate investigators found that many inspector
generals "lack objectivity and/or effectiveness in investigating whistle-blower
complaints." 'Watchdog'to 'Lap dog ', MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 15, 1990, at 22A. Senator
Jim Sasser (D-Tenn.) the subcommittee chairperson, said the report confirmed his
suspicion of an evolution from "Government watchdog[s]" to "political lap dog[s]" who
engage "in damage control for their agencies" and are "knee-deep in the very abuses
[that] they are supposed to prevent." Id.
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federal facilities for convicted felons.' Former INS District Director
Richard Smith has admitted that Krome is a "jail," not a processing
center as its name suggests. 74
Efforts have been made to end the lengthy detention of
Haitians at Krome. In late September 1992, Amnesty International
USA criticized the lengthy detention of Haitians at Krome, claiming
that governments should reveal legitimate grounds for any detention
of asylum seekers." During the summer of 1992, Florida Senators
Bob Graham and Connie Mack pushed for legislation to limit
detention at Krome to ninety days. 7' The United States Senate
7' See Larry Rohter, 'Processing'for Haitians is Time in a Rural Prison, N.Y.
TIMES, June21, 1992, § 4, at 18; Prison Conditions in the United States, INSDetention,
HUm. RTS. REP. (Human Rights Watch, New York, N.Y.), Nov. 1991.
1 Smith stated: "Krome looks so much like a jail . .. because it is a jail.... The
sign outside may say it's a processing center, but that's just semantics." Larry Rohter,
'Processing 'for Haitians is Tune in a Rural Prison, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1992, § 4,
at 18. Krome has, at times, held alien felons along with the facility's general
population. In 1987, Congress passed legislation prohibiting the use of federal funds to
detain alien felons at Krome unless the INS took measures to increase security by
February 28, 1988. H.R.J. Res. 395, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). Thereafter, felons
apparently were not housed in Krome for some time. In 1992, however, following
Hurricane Andrew, federal prisoners were moved to Krome. Attorneys for the detainees
complained and several weeks later the prisoners had all been moved out. To make
room for the prisoners, the INS moved the male INS detainees into the cafeteria and the
women into the medical clinic. According to attorneys, conditions at the Center at that
time were deplorable. Andrea Viglucci, Prisoner Transfer Frees Up Kromefor INS Use,
MIAw HERALD, Nov. 24, 1992, at 4B.
7 The Amnesty statement referred to the case of Vilvert Exume, a Haitian national
with an excellent claim to protection of the United States, who was detained in Texas.
"Only the fortunate, almost accidental encounter with an Amnesty International member
spared him from deportation to physical abuse or death in Haiti," the September 24,
1992 letter from Amnesty International reads. See Laura Parker, Refugees in Florida:
Rescue or Rejection, WASH. POST, May 26, 1991, at A5 (Exume was chained, shackled,
and handcuffed by INS authorities). The long term detention of asylum seekers,
Amnesty asserts, serves to punish those "oppressed of other nations" Congress sought
to welcome under the Refugee Act of 1980. In January 1992, the Director of Amnesty
International USA wrote U.S. officials requesting the immediate parole of all Haitians
and other asylum seekers at Krome. Letter from Amnesty International USA to Gene
McNary & William Barr (Jan. 13, 1993).
1 Lizette Alvarez, Graham Seeks 90-Day Limit on Krome Stays, MIAMI HERALD, July
30, 1991, at B1. The 90 day cap was to apply only to those who have family ties in the
community, who could post a "reasonable" bond, who were likely to show up at their
immigration hearing, and who were not considered a danger to the community. Id.
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approved the measure in July 1991, but the bill did not pass the
House, in large part because the Bush administration put up such a
fight. 77
The effect of the miserable conditions of confinement is to
discourage Haitians from pursuing any legal rights they may have,
and instead force them to "voluntarily" repatriate. Many Haitians,
in fact, have chosen repatriation or attempted suicide rather than
endure continued abuse at Krome.78 INS officials acknowledge the
main purpose of detention is to deter Haitians from coming to the
United States.79 Others maintain that detention as a deterrent is
illegal, improperly discouraging bona fide refugees from exercising
their right to apply for asylum.80 Moreover, it is far from clear that
detention deters immigration at all." For Haitians, often already
victims of repression at home, incarceration in the United States
represents a second, cruel, blow. 2
77 In 1981, the U.S. Attorney General and the INS Commissioner testified before
Congress to the effect that Krome was not intended to be a long-term detention facility.
Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1201 (11th Cir. 1989).
1 Mike Clary, Tensions Rise Among Haitian Refugees at Florida Camp, L.A. TIMaEs,
June 6, 1992, at A14.
7 GAO Report from William J. Anderson to the Honorable Walter E. Fauntroy,
Detention Policies Affecting Haitian Nationals, GAO/GGD-83-68, June 16, 1983, at iii.
The U.S. government began its interdiction and detention policies simultaneously as a
deterrent to Haitian immigration. The intent was, in the words of U.S. District Judge
James Lawrence King, to "treat Haitians as poorly as permissible" in order to discourage
immigration. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 514 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
See also infra notes 80-81.
50 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, for example, has
commented that the detention regulations violate the 1967 U.N. Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees. Other groups have suggested the regulations violate the Refugee
Act of 1980. See Arthur Helton, The Legality of Detaining Refugees in the United
States, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANCE 360 (1986).
11 Detention is also costly (the INS pays incarceration costs of well over $50 million
per year). GAO Report, supra note 79, at iv. Tests of well-designed plans for release
into the community, case-monitoring, and sponsorship have been successful in ensuring
that applicants show up for asylum hearings. Such programs should replace detention.
Absent these reforms, Congress should enact legislation such as that proposed by Senator
Graham, limiting detention to 90 days. See generally Helton, supra note 80, at 369-72.
1 In a letter written by Haitian detainees at Krome after the September 1991 military
coup in Haiti, they pleaded with INS officials to ensure that their asylum claims be fairly
considered:
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V. Cuban and Haitian Refugees: A Disparity in Treatment
In early January 1993, the Haitians at Krome engaged in a
nine-day hunger strike, 3 following the arrival of fifty-two Cubans
who had "commandeered" a Cuban commuter flight from Havana to
Varadero, Cuba, diverting it to Miami." All the Cubans were
released from Krome within forty-eight hours.8 5 To the Haitians this
was a painful reminder of the double standard.8" The Haitians were
protesting their unfair treatment by guards at Krome and were asking
to be paroled as the Cubans were. 7 The strike, which was intended
to send a message to the American people that Haitians were not here
Today we do not want to be demanding or to arouse anyone's anger,
but we want to make known our patriotic thoughts, the testimony of
our feelings concerning the loss of our relatives and our ancestors
who are being abused and murdered by the recent events. Look at
the life of the Haitian people; there is a law for all people: in the
eyes of God they are all equal, and they all have the same liberty
and the same privileges, which are owed to every one of them...
. We wish to emphasize... that right now we are living in the
most difficult and painful times of human life .... We prefer to die
than to live in the uncertainty that drowns our thoughts.
Letter from Haitians at Krome Detention Center (Oct. 1991) (on file with the New York
Law School Journal of Hwnan Rights).
Although the INS maintained that the hunger strike ended on day nine, dozens of
Haitians continued the strike for eleven days. See Larry Rohtcr, Haitians Take Clinton
at His Word, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1993, § 4, at 2.
" Mike Clary, Haitians Fasting to Protest Hero's Welcome for Cubans, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 4, 1993, at Al.
ILarry Rohter, Haitians Take Clinton at His Word, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1993, §
4, at2.
" Cubans arriving in Miami who have stated they are economic immigrants are
referred to by the INS as political refugees. Conversely, Haitians who are bona fide
refugees are routinely dismissed as economic refugees. Id.
"7 Most Haitian detainees have relatives in the U.S. willing to sponsor them upon
their release. Miami Mayor Xavier Suarez, a Cuban American, has requested the
closing of Krome, calling it an unnecessary burden on taxpayers and an insult to Haitian
asylum seekers. Suarez said it would make more sense to release the Haitians from
Krome into the custody of relatives or church groups, and allow them to work and
support themselves. Suarez estimated the average cost of detaining 200 individuals for
nine months to be about five million dollars. See Regional News in Florida, UPI, Jan.
6, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
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for food, but for political reasons, ended only after INS reportedly
threatened the Haitians with bodily harm and transfers away from
their families.88
The detention and parole policies89 aptly call attention to the
great disparities in our treatment of Cuban and Haitian refugees.90 In
many ways, immigration procedures towards Cubans and Haitians
that seek entry into the United States represent the extremes of United
States policy. Immigration policy towards Cuba tends to be generous
and humanitarian; immigration policy towards Haiti tends to be
stringent and inhumane.91
' Harold Maass, Faster Sees Victory in HeightenedAwareness, MIAMI HERALD, Jan.
14, 1993, at lB.
" Federal courts have not always ruled in favor of Haitians challenging the INS
parole policy. In Betrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1981), the appeals court
overturned the lower court's finding that the District Director's parole decisions in the
Haitian cases were discriminatory on the basis of race and national origin, reasoning that
the lower court had improperly substituted its own judgment for the judgment of the
District Director. Id. at 214. More recently, however, a federal court judge in Miami
found that the INS parole policy at Krome discriminated against the Haitians. Ray v.
United States Dep't of Justice, No. 89-239 (S.15. Fla. Nov. 5, 1989). A case currently
pending before the district court in Miami again challenges that the INS' parole policy
is illegally based on race or national origin. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Barr, No. 93-0080
(S.D. Fla. filed Jan. 15, 1993).
o Even when INS Commissioner Gene McNary implemented a more liberal parole
policy in May 1990, the Haitians failed to benefit. "Nearly one month into the program
no Haitians had been approved for parole in Miami even though Haitians constituted
nearly 2/3 of those detained in the district," reads a section of the report written by the
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights in New York. The report concluded that the
pilot parole project had demonstrated that detained refugees could be freed from
incarceration while they pursue their claims for asylum without compromising legitimate
government interests. Interim Report on the Pilot Parole Project of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, (Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, New York, N.Y.), Nov.
1990.
"' In response to growing attacks by domestic black organizations on the
government's handling of the Haitian refugee problem, the White House announced in
1980 that approximately 15,000 Haitians who arrived in the late 1970s and 1980, along
with at least 114,000 Cubans who arrived during the Mariel boatlift, would be classified
as "entrants," a term not defined in law, and would be allowed to remain in the U.S.
until January 1991. Haitian refugees who arrived in the U.S. before October 10, 1980,
and established contact with the INS before that date, would be placed in the "entrant"
category and the final status of the Haitian refugees would be left to Congress. See
Refugees Granted Six-month Reprieve, Facts on File World News Digest, June 27, 1980,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File; Peter A. Schey, The Black Boat People,
1993] HAITIAN DISCRIMINATION 291
Since the 1920s, when the INS first collected such data,
Cuban immigrants to the United States have constituted a migration
stream that has been approximately three times that of Haitians.'
Yet while the Cubans are regularly "paroled" into the United States
and freed from detention, Haitians are not. 91 While the Cubans are
authorized to work and eventually obtain permanent resident status,
the Haitians are systematically detained and deported.' Even when
Haitians are released from detention, they are frequently denied work
permits, 95 which are routinely granted to Cubans released from
9 MiORATIoN TODAY 7, 9 (1981).
92 See INS Strongly Favors Cubans Over Haitians, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 9, 1991, at
10A.
" While Haitians largely are detained for violating immigration law, the Cubans in
detention arc overwhelmingly migrants from the Mariel Boatlift who have criminal
records. Anne Rochell, Mariel's Hopes End Behind Bars on Two Shores; Many
Deportees Still Imprisoned in Cuba, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 1, 1993, at A12. Indeed,
since June 1992, Cubans arriving in the United States are no longer even detained for
processing. See Jeanne DeQuine, Haitians Accuse U.S. of 'Double Standard', USA
TODAY, June 3, 1991, at 7A.
In late February 1993, a Haitian commandeered a plane to West Palm Beach,
claiming he was fleeing political oppression in Haiti. The man was met by a FBI swat
team, arrested, and charged with air piracy. Joe Chrysdale, Missionary Plane Hyacked
in Haiti, Diverted to Miami, UPI, Feb. 18, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Omni File. Federal public defenders argued that their Haitian client should be treated
like Cuban nationals who are not prosecuted, even when they use force, kidnapping, and
hijacking to find freedom in the United States. The Haitian was released on bond
pending his trial. See Joanne Kenen, Missionaries Hjacked from Haiti, Land Safely in
Florida, Reuters, Feb. 18, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File; Rachel
Swarns, Freed Haitian Hijacker Puts Faith in System, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 26, 1993, at
IA.
" Alan Elsner, U.S. Sends Back Haitian Boat People, Reuters, Nov. 18, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. The Administration has responded to
the allegation of discrimination by pointing out the many difficulties encountered with
the Castro government when they try to return people to Cuba. However, the Cubans
are not eligible for residency in the U.S. until INS paroles or admits them to the United
States. Moreover, just because Congress has ensured special protection for the Cubans
does not relieve INS of its obligation to fully and fairly review the parole requests of
Haitians and others detained in their care. Even if Congress passed legislation similar
to the Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA) for the Haitians, the Haitians would still have to
rely on the INS to parole them so they could be eligible to become residents.
" The Haitian Refugee Center has successfully sued the INS to obtain work permits
for Haitians, which are required by law to be given to paroled asylum seekers. See,
e.g., Augustin v. Harrison, No. 86-882 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
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detention. 96
Congress' actions in 1966 account in large measure for the
blatant difference in treatment between the two groups. Under the
Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act (CAA) of 1966, as amended, aliens
from Cuba who arrive here who have not affected an "entry" into the
United States, whether or not they seek asylum, can apply for lawful
permanent resident status after one year of physical presence in the
United States. 97 What distinguishes the Cuban Adjustment Act from
all other acts that adjust parolees and humanitarian residence to
permanent residence is that it is open-ended and does not have a cut-
off date.9
Cubans generally are not subjected to any scrutiny as to the
reasons they fled Cuba. Because they are eligible to adjust after one
year, few Cubans even have to make political asylum applications.
Still, in 1989, almost ten times more Cubans were granted political
asylum than Haitians, despite the terribly oppressive military
government in Haiti during that time." Additionally, Cubans are
" Bill Adair & Victor Junco, Stowaways' Try Not Unusual, ST. PETERSBURO TIMES,
Jan. 24, 1992, at lB.
' The alien must be eligible to receive an immigrant visa and be admissible to the
United States as a permanent resident. Spouses and children accompanying the aliens
who are applying for this adjustment are also covered by the provisions of this Act.
Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966)
(current version at 8 U.S.C. 1255 note (1988)).
Memorandum from Ruth Ellen Wasem, Specialist in Social Legislation, to the
House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration, and
Refugees 3 (Nov. 15, 1991) (on file with the New York Law School Journal of Human
Rights). Some have argued that the CAA acts as a magnet, attracting Cubans who would
not otherwise qualify for admission to the United States. Jeanne DeQuine, Cuban
Refugees Flocking to U.S. in Record Numbers, Gannett News Service, Mar. 31, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. But the "magnet" argument is much
more frequently used in attempting to discourage a fairer Haitian policy. Laurence
Jolidon, Religious Holiday Gives Haitian Kids Short Break, USA TODAY, May 29, 1992,
at 9A. See also Christopher Marquis, Haitian Exodus May Loom, MIAMI HERALD, Nov.
14, 1992, at 1A.
"INS Strongly Favors Cubans Over Haitians, MIAMIHERALD, Sept. 9, 1991, at 10A.
Many of the Cuban immigrants have been characterized as humanitarian entrants, and
Cuba ranked at the top of countries generating humanitarian entrants to the United States
from 1946 to 1989. Although Haiti, along with Cuba, is among 12 countries in the
world which generated more than 1000 people who sought asylum in the United States
in the Fiscal Years 1981 to 1990, very few Haitians have received asylum. In 1989,
5245 Cuban refugees and asylees were granted residency, versus 27 Haitians. From
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eligible to enter the United States as part of the Government-
sponsored Refugee Resettlement Program, or through the sponsorship
of the Cuban-American National Foundation. "m No comparable
programs exist for Haitians.1 1 United States immigration laws also
provide annual ceilings for refugee admissions. While there have
been 3000 slots for those in Latin America and the Caribbean, °" in
practice it has been the Cubans who could be expected to benefit
from these."°3
Some critics argue that failure to give Haiti the same
designation of "special humanitarian concern" given Cuba,
considering Haiti's decades-long record of oppression, is racist." In
response to such criticism, the Administration is reorganizing part of
1980 to 1989, more than 106,000 Cuban refugees and asylees were granted residency,
compared to only 363 from other Caribbean countries, including Haiti. Id. See also
Memorandum from Ruth Ellen Wasem, Specialist in Social Legislation, to the House
Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration, and Refugees
4 (June 14, 1991) (on file with the New York Law School Journal of Hwnan Rights).
"® Under the Refugee Resettlement Program, 1070 Cubans were admitted through
the first eight months of fiscal 1991; under the Cuban-American National Foundation,
1734 Cubans had been admitted as of the end of May and more than 8500 since the
programs' inception in 1988. See Alfonso Chardy, 450 Cubans to Get Visas, Foundation
Says, MIAMI HERALD, May 20, 1992, at 3B.
I The number of Cubans requesting nonimmigrant visas for travel to the United
States has increased steadily in recent years. A total of 14,000 Cubans arrived in
Florida by plane with tourist visas in 1990. The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service statistics show that 30 to 40% of these Cubans did not return to Cuba. Sandra
Walewski, Up to 40,000 Cubans Will 'Overstay' Their Visas, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25,
1991, at A3.
Mary Benanti, Administration Hikes Refugee Numbers for 1992, Gannett News
Service, Sept. 23, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
11 Although bona fide Haitian political refugees are generally denied asylum, many
Haitians have become permanent residents through the Cuban/Haitian Entrant
Adjustment and Legalization Provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 (IRCA). Under the Act, Cubans and Haitians who entered the United States before
July 1, 1982 were eligible for permanent resident status. 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (1988 &
Supp. III 1991). They, in turn, have petitioned for their immediate relatives to obtain
residency.
11 See Mike Clary, Haitians Fasting to Protest Hero's Welcome for Cubans, L.A.
TIMEs, Jan. 4, 1993, at Al; Ron Harris, Fleeing Haitians Failing to Find a U.S.
Advocacy, L.A. TfIEs, Dec. 3, 1991, at A5; infra note 198.
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the INS and attempting to reduce the role of the State Department in
the asylum-seeking process, to make it more equitable and consistent
for all nationalities.105 But some argue that the Haitians continue to
receive unjust treatment even under the new process. 106
Incidents involving Miami city officials also illustrate the
disparity in treatment between Haitians and Cubans. For example,
shortly before Aristide was inaugurated, Miami officials told local
Haitians that they could celebrate the inauguration in a local park so
long as Fidel Castro was not invited to the event in Haiti. to7 Haitian
leaders protested that such a policy violated the First Amendment.108
Ultimately, Miami Mayor Xavier L. Suarez reversed the questionable
restriction on the Haitians' celebration.109
10 When the government published the new asylum rules in 1990, it highlighted its
intent to create an asylum adjudication branch separate from INS enforcement branches,
employing a new corps of asylum officers under national supervision outside the usual
structure of local INS district offices to improve the quality and consistency of
decisionmaking. The regulations also established a documentation center to disseminate
to asylum officers credible human rights materials from governmental and non-
governmental sources, thereby limiting exclusive reliance on Department of State
materials that tended to reflect United States policy concerns. An Interim Assessment of
the Asylum Process of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, (Nat'l Asylum Study
Project, A Project of the Harvard Law School Immigration and Refugee Program on the
Legal Profession, Cambridge, Mass.), Dec. 1992, 1-2. INS asylum decisions under
interim regulations prior to 1990 received widespread criticism from governmental and
non-governmental agencies for doing little more than adopting the recommendation of
the Department of State, regardless of the merits of the case. For example, the General
Accounting Office found that INS examiners followed the recommendations of the
Department of State more than 95% of the time. Id. at 1.
"o5 Id. at 3-4. Preliminary examples of ongoing special treatment of Haitian asylum
cases include expedited scheduling of these cases, special scrutiny of the asylum officer's
assessment, INS prejudgment of cases, over-reliance on Department of State in
decisionmaking, and compromise of confidentiality. Id. at 3-4. See also INS Strongly
Favors Cubans Over Haitians, MiAwM HERALD, Sept. 9, 1991, at 10A.
'" Nancy San Martin, Castro Clause on Inaugural Upsets City's Haitian Leaders,
MIANH HERALD, Jan. 31, 1991, at 3B.
1. Id.
o Letter from Mayor Xavier L. Suarez to Sonia Casimir, Front for National Change
and Democracy et al. (Feb. 1, 1991) (on file with the New York Law School Journal of
Human Rights).
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VI. The United States-Haiti Interdiction Agreement
The dilemma posed in recent months, following the
September 1991 military coup in Haiti,110 raises anew the
controversies surrounding the migrant interdiction agreement between
the United States and Haiti and United States Haitian policy in
general." In September 1981, the Reagan Administration reacted to
mass migration of Haitian asylum seekers arriving in boats by
establishing a program to interdict Haitians. 2  The Reagan
Administration determined that the amount of undocumented Haitians
coming to the United States had "threatened the welfare and safety of
communities," 1 despite the fact that Haitians comprised less than
two percent of the undocumented population of the United States at
that time.114
The interdiction agreement authorizes the United States Coast
Guard to board and inspect private Haitian vessels on the high seas
and to interrogate and return undocumented passengers to Haiti. 1 '
Haiti is the only foreign government with which the United States has
such an alien migrant interdiction agreement. The agreement, made
1' Jean Bertrand Aristide, Haiti's first democratically-elected president, was ousted
in September 1991. Deborah Sharp, Haitian Refugees See Hope With a New
Administration, USA TODAY, Nov. 27, 1992, at 3A.
"I The same Coast Guard that searches for Haitians also searches for Cubans. The
difference is that regardless of the political conditions of those countries, and regardless
of what the individual Cubans and Haitians have to say, the Coast Guard operates with
the intention of returning Haitians to Haiti, and with the intention of bringing all the
Cubans they find safely to the United States. In 1991, 2203 Cubans came to the United
States on boats or rafts, and in 1992, 2205 did. Cuban Influx Highest Since Mariel
Boatifl, Reuters, Oct. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. The
1992 figure represents the largest number of Cuban boat people since the Cuban Mariel
Exodus. Id.
112 Peter A. Schey & Todd Howland, Perspective on Haitian Refugees; No Haven
for the Poor and Black, L.A. TIMwEs, Dec. 1, 1991, at M5.
11 Id.
14 Id. The Haitian refugees were termed "economic migrants" by U.S. authorities,
despite the overwhelming evidence of gross violations of human rights under "Baby
Doc" Duvalier, who assured the Reagan Administration that the returnees would not be
penalized. See For Later Presidential Primaries; U.S. Can Alleviate Miseries of
Haitians, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1990, at A24.
15 Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. §
1182 (1988).
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with Haiti's dictator Jean-Claude ("Baby Doc") Duvalier,"' was
entered into under United States threats to remove economic aid. 11 7
Since then, Coast Guard vessels have patrolled the waters of
the Windward Passage between Molest Nicolas and the Guantanamo
Province of Cuba -- 500 miles from United States shores -- in search
of Haitian refugees. 1 The purpose of these patrols is to prevent
Haitians from reaching the United States, and it works. The Coast
Guard believes it detects ninety percent of all Haitian boat refugees
headed toward the United States.119 Those who do not make it to
within twelve miles of United States shores are subject to
interdiction. 120
The 1981 Interdiction agreement clearly specifies that bona
fide refugees were not to be returned to Haiti.121  Yet of the over
11 Former Haitian President Prosper Avril has stated that he believes the interdiction
agreement is illegal under Haitian law, since an exchange of diplomatic letters is not a
proper method of entering into a bilateral agreement with another country. LAWYERS
ComMr=rr FOR HUMAN RiHMo , REFUafi R P LEMEN: THE FORCED RErUMN OF HAnIANs
UNDER THE U.S.-HAmAN INTERDICTION AoREEMENT 13 (1990).
1"7 See Mimi Whitefield, Patching a Tattered Haiti, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 5, 1988,
at 2lB. United States aid to the Haitian government was partially conditioned on Haitian
cooperation with U.S. efforts to control illegal immigration. Following the aborted
elections in Haiti in 1987, Haitian migrant interdiction operations continued to receive
cooperation from the Haitian government, despite the cut off of other aid. See id.
"s Norman Kempster, U.S. Recalls Envoy to Haiti Over Police Attack, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 28, 1992, at A9.
19 Sandra Dibble, Haitian Odyssey Leaves Wake of Despair; 142 Suffer Peril at Sea
- and Fail, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 6, 1989, at IA.
"I Despite a December 1988 presidential proclamation extending the U.S. territorial
waters from three to twelve miles, Haitians interdicted between that time and October
1992 had to make it to within the three mile limit. See U.S. Stops Haitian Refugees
After 700-mile Voyage, Cm. TRIB., Mar. 26, 1989, at 24. On October 15, 1992, a rule
amending the INS' definition of "external boundary" was published in the Federal
Register, extending the territorial sea of the U.S. to twelve nautical miles for purposes
of interception. The implementing rule was undertaken to help the federal government's
anti-smuggling efforts. Changing Definition of External Boundary of the United States,
57 Fed. Reg. 47,257 (1992) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 287). Shortly thereafter, a
group of 70 Haitians intercepted ten miles from U.S. shores were allowed to come to
the United States to pursue asylum claims. Larry Rohter, Policy on Haitian Refugees
Blurs in Political Transition, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1992, at A10.
121 The Interdiction Agreement states: "It is understood that under these
arrangements the United States Government does not intend to return to Haiti any
Haitian migrants whom the United States authorities determine to qualify for refugee
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23,000 Haitians intercepted since the program's inception in 1981
until September 1991, INS determined that only twenty-eight were
qualified to apply for asylum in the United States."m Twenty of these
were brought to the United States after INS instituted several changes
status." Agreement on Migrants and Interdiction, Sept. 23, 1981, U.S.-Haiti, T.I.A.S.
No. 10,241, at 3560. Indeed, INS' own instructions caution INS officers on board the
Coast Guard cutters to be "keenly attuned ...to any evidence which may reflect an
individual's well-founded fear of persecution." Susan Freinkel, A Slow, Leaking Boat
to Limbo, AM. LAW. MEDIA, THE RECoRDER, Dec. 19, 1991, at 1. The basic command
of international law is not to return a refugee to a place where he or she may be
persecuted. In 1968, the U.S. became a party to the United Nations Protocol relating
to the Status of Refugees. Article 33(1) of the Convention and Protocol sets forth the
principle of non-refoulement: "No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler")
a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion." Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, Apr. 28, 1951, art. 33(1), 189 U.N.T.S. 150. Upon accession to the
Protocol, the U.S. automatically was bound to respect the principles of non-refoulement.
By implication, the procedures to determine whether individuals warrant protection from
return must be fair and reliable. See Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan.
31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
' Susan Freinkel, A Slow, Leaking Boat to Limbo, AM. LAw. MEDIA, THE REORDER,
Dec. 19, 1991, at 1. A report submitted to the House Judiciary Committee stated:
"From 1981 through 1990, 22,940 Haitians were interdicted at sea. Of this number,
INS considered 11 Haitians qualified to apply for asylum in the U.S." Memorandum
from Ruth Ellen Wasem, Specialist in Social Legislation, to the House Judiciary
Committee, Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration, and Refugees 3 (Nov. 15,
1991) (on file with the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights). From January
to October of 1991, only 20 interdicted Haitians were identified as qualified to apply for
asylum. Id. at 4.
In June 1989, the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees presented an
affidavit to the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees,
and International Law. The affidavit was from returned Haitians who alleged that their
stated fears of political persecution in Haiti were ignored by U.S. immigration
authorities. One politically active Haitian, who was interdicted and returned to Haiti in
March 1989, told of Haitian soldiers having shot him four times in the legs at the time
of his arrest in January 1988. He then spent 10 months in prison. Referring to his
interview aboard the Coast Guard cutter, he stated: "I told them of my circumstances
and specifically said that I preferred to kill myself instead of returning to Haiti. They
returned me anyway." Lively D. C. Hearings Challenge Refugee Double Standard, HAM
INsior (Nat'l. Coalition for Haitian Refugees, New York, N.Y.), July 1989, at 1, 2.
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in the pre-screening interdiction process,1" which was affected March
1, 1991, after President Aristide took power."2 During the Duvalier
regimes and the military governments that followed, Haitians sent
back to their country were often persecuted. " Even the courts found
that Haitians deported back to Haiti were sometimes subject to
surveillance, arrest, questioning, jailing and beatings, all without due
process of the law. 126
The Haitian interdiction program has proceeded in four
phases. 27 The first phase lasted from September 1981 until the
military coup that overthrew President Jean Bertrand Aristide in
September 1991. With the coup began the second phase, which
" Under the enhanced interviews, Haitians asserting or hinting that they had reasons
to fear being returned home were to receive a more in-depth interview with the INS
officer (twenty minutes versus five). Notes of interviews were to be recorded and kept.
Still, even after the enhanced interview process began, problems remained. For
instance, the INS' opening statement to intercepted Haitians acknowledged that the Coast
Guard cutter would be returning to Haiti where "most of you [Haitians] will be
disembarked." Haitians were then told that their name, date, and place of birth would
be given to Haitian authorities on their return. See Defendants' Description of Current
Procedures for Interviewing Haitian Migrants, Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, No. 91-
2653 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 1991).
12 The year 1990 saw the lowest level of interdictions in seven years. During
Aristide's tenure, the number of refugees attempting to reach the United States dropped
dramatically. The Coast Guard reported that during some months of Aristide's term,
they did not encounter a single Haitian vessel. United States officials reportedly
attributed this to the new hope Haitians had for improved conditions under the newly
elected government. This supports other statistics indicating that the number of Haitians
fleeing by boat reflects the political climate in Haiti. Ironically, almost three times more
Haitians were deemed political refugees under a democratic government then during an
entire decade marked by human rights abuses and tyranny. See Memorandum from Ruth
Ellen Wasem, Specialist in Social Legislation, to the House Judiciary Committee,
Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration, and Refugees 4 (Nov. 15, 1991) (on
file with the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights).
125 See, e.g., LAWYERS COMMiTrEE FOR HumAN RIGHTS, REFUGEE REFOuLEMEmr: THE
FORCED RETURN OF HAmANS UNDER THE U.S.-HAIrAN INTERDICrIoN AGREEMENr 4 (1990).
12' Cheryl Tompkin, A Criminal at the Gate: A Case for the Haitian Refugee, 7
BLACK L.J. 387, 400 (1983).
"27 Coast Guard cutters which once figured so heavily in drug interdiction have been
diverted to capture and return people fleeing one of the most dreaded tyrannies in the
Caribbean. According to INS Interdiction Chief Leon Jennings, most of the boats
intercepted by the Coast Guard are destroyed so other Haitians won't use them to leave.
LAwYEmS CoMMrItE FOR HUMAN RJCmS, REUG RmuLaEaN THE FORCED RmuRNm oF
HA SANs U DER THE U.S.-HAiAN INTERDCTION AGREEMENT 20 (1990).
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lasted from September 30, 1991 until November 18, .1991.'28 Due to
the political violence in Haiti during this phase, the United States
suspended repatriation of the Haitians when the democratically elected
government of Haiti was toppled. 29 The "screening" interviews of
the Haitians by INS officials nonetheless continued.3 0
Shortly before his death, Congressman Claude Pepper introduced a bill that would
have directed the U.S. to bring Haitiani ashore for asylum interviews. This bill called
for interviewing intercepted Haitians on land in order to determine their reasons for
fleeing. The Congressman died before his bill could be given full legislative
consideration. David Hancock & Sandra Dibble, Haitians: We Want Respect, MIAMI
HERALD, July 22, 1990, at IA. Sometime after the late Claude Pepper drafted his Haitian
bill, Miami Mayor Xavier Suarez distributed bumper stickers reading "Interdict Drugs,
Not Haitians." Helpfor the Haitians and Florida, ST. PETERSBuRo TIMES, Feb. 10, 1992,
at 10A. At a September 17, 1991 press conference the mayor called for interviews of
Haitians on land, at a minimum, before they are returned to Haiti. Miami Suarez
Condemns Haitian Interdiction, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 18, 1991, at 2B.
In October 1990, seven human rights and refugee organizations filed a petition
with the Organization of American States (OAS), asking the organization to affirm that
the interdiction of Haitians at sea violates U.S. obligations under international law, and
to call on the U.S. government to end its interdiction program. The petition charged that
the U.S. program discriminates against Haitians, who are the group subject to such
interdiction, and denies them a fair opportunity to present their claims of persecution.
In mid-March 1993, the OAS issued a resolution declaring that the Haitian interdiction
program violates international law. The OAS resolution further states that it is in
possession of information leading it to conclude that "Haitians who are so returned to
Haiti ...very frequently suffer persecution at the hands of the Haitian authorities."
Organization of American States Press Release, OAS Human Rights Committee Calls
Clinton Haitian Interdiction Policy a Violation of International Law, Mar. 19, 1993,
(citing Precautionary Measures Taken by the Inter-American Commission in Case No.
10.675 (United States) at 83d period of sessions).
' Lizette Alvarez, High Court OKs Repatriations, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 1, 1992, at
IA. The U.S. State Department agreed not to repatriate the Haitians in order to pursue
a regional solution agreement. But their search for other Caribbean and South American
countries to accept the Haitians failed. Unable to find a regional solution and unwilling
to bring the Haitians to the United States, the U.S. government began forcibly
repatriating the Haitians on November 18, 1991. Id.
"s Attorneys for the Haitians argued that many of the Haitians interdicted after the
September coup were not headed to the United States in the first place. The government
advanced no explanation, the attorneys said, as to their authority or justification in
interfering with those Haitians attempting to escape political persecution in Haiti, let
alone to forcibly return them to Haiti. Haitians headed for the Bahamas, Cuba, and
other destinations were routinely interdicted and detained by the Coast Guard. See
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at App., Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1245 (1992); Coast Guard Returns 137 Haitians, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 17, 1989,
at 2B.
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VII. Recent United States Haitian Policy
Phase three of the interdiction program began on November
18, 1991, when the United States again commenced repatriating
"screened out" Haitians who had not been found to have a credible
fear of persecution upon return to Haiti."I One day later the Haitian
Refugee Center filed a class action complaint seeking to restrain the
forced repatriations. At the time of the suit, the "screening"
interviews of the Haitians were cursory and conducted by INS
officials with virtually no knowledge of Haitian politics or culture.,3
The Haitian Refugee Center did not challenge the interdiction
program or ask the court to bring all interdicted Haitians to the
United States. It simply asked that the Haitians receive fair screening
interviews before repatriations continued."' Following the filing of
' On November 18, 1991, 538 Haitians held on the Coast Guard cutters "Dallas"
and "Confidence" were forcibly returned to Haiti. Barbara Crossette, 135 Feared Lost
as Haitian Boat Sinks Off Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1991, at Al.
132 The interviews, many of which had been conducted on board the Coast Guard
cutters, often lasted no more than five minutes. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, No. 91-
2653 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 1991). The INS officers, while interviewing Haitians fleeing
persecution, could not name or recognize the following: the President and Prime
Minister of the de facto regime, the General (Cedras) at the head of the military coup,
the popular name for President Aristide, Ti-Legliz (church movement of President
Aristide), Lafanmi Selavi (orphanage established by President Aristide), and many
others. Leon Jennings, Chief of the Asylum Pre-Screening Unit based in Miami, who
was sent to Guantanamo to oversee the interview process, did not know that the Haitian
Red Cross was not a member of the International Red Cross - significant because the
government turned repatriated Haitians over to the Haitian Red Cross. Id. at app. 3-42.
Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1502-03 (11th Cir. 1992). At the
time the Haitian Refugee Center filed suit, only about 50 of the more than 1800 Haitians
interviewed had been screened in. Alan Eisner, U.S. Sends Back Haitian Boat People,
Reuters, Nov. 18, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. Testimony
revealed that the pre-screening interviews were a complete sham - a formal validation
of a predetermined result. See Bill Frelick, The Haitian Boat People, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Nov. 20, 1991, at 18. Most of the Haitians interviewed under the defective
interview process were never given another chance to make their case for asylum.
Ironically, Cubans who made it to the Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba during this time
were flown to the United States and paroled into the community. Cuban Influx Highest
Since Mariel Boaift, Reuters, Oct. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni
File.
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the suit, the interview process improved dramatically: 134 over 10,000
Haitians, most of whom were interviewed on land, were screened in
and provisionally admitted to the United States to apply for political
asylum between the time of the suit and the time repatriations began
again.1 35
Ultimately, however, the fight for the Haitian refugees in the
Haitian Refugee Center case was lost. Although District Court Judge
Atkins issued three separate restraining orders in favor of the
Haitians, three times the Appeals Court for the Eleventh Circuit
stayed or vacated the judge's orders. 36 The Appeals Court found
' INS conducted 36,596 screening interviews at the U.S. Naval Base in
Guantanamo, Cuba from October 1991 to June 1992 and screened in 10,319 people for
a screen-in rate of 28%, according to official INS statistics. The screening rates,
however, fluctuated widely despite the fact that political conditions did not significantly
change during that period. In mid-January, for example, INS screened in 85% of the
Haitians interviewed, but in February, only approximately 40%. Susan Beck, Cast
Away, THE AM. LAW., Oct. 1992, at 51, 57. In April, well after the Court allowed
repatriations to continue, the rate dropped to a record low of two percent, raising
concerns in Congress. Only pressure from Haitian refugee advocates forced the rate
back up to about 35%. Several interpreters at Guantanamo provided sworn statements
detailing the heavy pressure placed on asylum officers by the U.S. Department of State
to decrease the number of Haitians screened in. See Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants'
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motions for Expedited Discovery at Exhibits
21, 24, Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. McNary, No. 92-1258 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). According
to lawyers for the Haitians, INS staff who refused to bow to this pressure were
redeployed and those suspected of screening in too many Haitians closely scrutinized.
The lawyers also maintain that after the Court permitted the return of the Haitians,
Haitians already screened in but still waiting at Guantanamo were reinterviewed
according to new, higher standards, and punished if they attempted to assert their legal
rights. Id. at 11-21; see also Ruling Expected Monday in Haitian Refugee Case, UPI,
Apr. 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
I" See Cheryl Little, Viewpoints, MIAhI HERALD, Dec. 3, 1992, at 25A. INS,
however, never told those screened in of the decision. The Haitians were left to infer
it from whether the military put them on a boat for Haiti or put them in a different camp
for further screening. An Interim Assessment of the Asylum Process of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service, (Nat'l Asylum Study Project, A Project of the Harvard Law
School Immigration and Refugee Program on the Legal Profession, Cambridge, Mass.),
Dec. 1992.
I" Judge Atkin's first Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) was based on Article 33
of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which prohibits the
forced return of persons to a country where they would be persecuted. Baker, 953 F.2d
at 1503. His second TRO was based on the Administrative Procedures Act (APA),
which subjects actions by agencies such as the INS to review and forbids them from
302 NYLS JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. X
that the Haitians had no legally enforceable rights in the United States
because they were outside United States territory.13 Only Judge
Hatchett, the one African-American judge on the Appeals panel,
remarked in a dissenting opinion: "Haitians, unlike other aliens from
anywhere in the world, are prevented from freely reaching the
continental United States."13
In a brief two sentence order without comment, issued on
January 31, 1992, the Supreme Court ruled eight to one to lift the
ban on repatriations. 1 9 When repatriations began on February 1,
1992, more than 11,000 Haitians were held at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba."+ Amnesty International expressed outrage at the forced
abusing their discretion. Id. at 1504. His third TRO enjoined the government from
forcibly returning the Haitians until it granted the Haitian Refugee Center attorneys
access to them. Id.
'1 Id. at 1510.
'ss Id. at 1516 (emphasis added). A Miami Herald editorial stated:
If the president insists that interdicting the Haitians just outside our
boundaries negates whatever rights they would acquire under U.S.
law, then the interdiction program becomes a lawless device to
deprive Haitians of the rights Congress conferred, not a lawful
means to protect them from adversity on the high seas.
Laurence H. Tribe & Jonathan S. Massey, Haiti's Refugees: The Administration Adopts
Lawless Policy, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 9, 1992, at IC.
I" Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992). Justice Blackmun alone
wrote: "If indeed the Haitians are to be returned to an uncertain future in their strife-
torn homeland, that ruling should come from this Court after full and careful
consideration of the merits of their claims." Id. at 1246. The decision by the high court
not to review the case paved the way for further abuses of the Haitian refugees.
Arguably, after the Supreme Court order, the INS was free to screen in all light-colored
Haitians and screen out all dark-skinned Haitians, since this would not be subject to legal
challenge. Yet many were surprised when President Bush issued his May 24, 1992
Executive Order stopping all Haitian interviews. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg.
23,133 (1992).
11 Juan J. Walte & Marilyn Greene, Haitians Renew High Court Appeal; Returnees
Persecuted, Lawyers Say, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 1992, at 4A. Testimony by a senior
official of the GAO before a House sub-committee revealed that the INS had lost at least
2500 files at Guantanamo, due to disorganization and disarray, mistook "screened-in"
Haitians for "screened-out" Haitians, and apparently rescreened and even repatriated
previously "screened-in" Haitians. Those erroneously returned included at least 38
unaccompanied children and a 16-year old girl, Marie Zette, who was killed in her bed
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returns.1 41 The United Nations similarly condemned the repatriations,
expressing fear that those returned would be exposed to real
danger.142
On May 24, 1992, President Bush issued an Executive Order
from Kennebunkport, Maine, ordering INS to repatriate Haitians
interdicted at sea without any investigation into the likelihood of their
persecution in Haiti ("Kennebunkport Order").4  Thus began the
fourth phase of the interdiction program, which reversed a United
States policy dating from 1981, under which refugees were
interdicted in international waters and screened in to see if they had
reasonable fears of persecution.
by Tonton Macoutes the first night after her forced return. Memorandum from Ruth
Ellen Wasem, Specialist in Social Legislation, to the House Judiciary Committee,
Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration, and Refugees (Nov. 15, 1991) (on file
with the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights). See also Ron Howell, U.S.
May Have Erred on Some Haitians, NEWSDAY, Apr. 2, 1992, at 120.
141 In a January 1992 report, Amnesty International said it had received reports of
grave human rights violations after the coup. Amnesty stated they knew of "several
cases in the past years where asylum-seekers who were refused asylum in the USA and
returned to Haiti were imprisoned and in some cases ill-treated on their return."
AMNESTY bIrBNATNA, HAM TE HUMAN Rim ThAEDY; HUMAN RKUs VOLATMONS
SINCE THE CouP 24 (Jan. 1992).
142 Nancy Etzwiler, U.S. Should Give Haitians Temporary Refuge, Not Repatriation,
STAR TRIB., Feb. 25, 1992, at 9A. Just before the January Supreme Court decision
allowing repatriations to continue, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) confirmed that dozens of Haitian refugees returned to Haiti due to faulty
procedures were persecuted upon their return and forced to flee a second time. The
UNHCR said that they and U.S. government officials had documents detailing the
harassment, beating, torture, and murder of returned Haitians for the "crime" of having
fled. Attorneys for the Haitians learned of this less than 56 hours before filing their
petitions for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. The Haitians' attorneys claimed
that the government precluded them from obtaining this information in a timely fashion.
See Plaintiffs' Application to Stay the Mandates of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit Pending Certiorari, Exhibit A, Declaration of James A. Rogers
of Feb. 9, 1992, Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20, Haitian Refugee Ctr. v.
Baker, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992). After the UNHCR publicly confirmed that
they had evidence of returnees being persecuted, they were informed they could no
longer conduct interviews of the Haitians at Guantanamo without a military presence.
The UNHCR submitted an amicus brief in McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., arguing that
forced returns of Haitians who would face persecution upon return violates a U.N. treaty
signed by Washington.
14 Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992).
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A federal appeals court in New York subsequently found that
President Bush's Executive Order was illegal and in violation of
United States international law on the treatment of refugees. 144 Only
Judge John Herbert Walker, a cousin of President Bush's,
dissented. s14  Although the case is now pending before the United
States Supreme Court, the Court is allowing the government to
continue with the repatriations until they make a decision on the
merits of the case."14
The United States government's response to the widespread
condemnation of the Kennebunkport Order has been to claim that
Haitians in fear for their lives can apply for United States asylum at
the United States Embassy in Port-au-Prince. 147 But for numerous
reasons, this program offers no real protection at all. First, to expect
Haitian refugees to openly approach the United States Embassy -- just
a block away from the police station and surrounded by military
personnel -- is preposterous, Haitian refugee advocates suggest. 148
144 Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1367, (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 52 (1992). The court found that the order violated § 243(h) of the Refugee
Act of 1980 that prohibits the return of anyone who would be persecuted on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
McNary, 969 F.2d at 1367.
"t McNary, 969 F.2d at 1369.
'"While the Supreme Court summarily declined to review the Baker case, they did
grant the government's petition for certiorari in the Haitian Centers Council case, after
the Second Circuit found that President Bush's Kennebunkport order was illegal.
McNary v. Haitian Centers Council, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992). The Supreme Court initially
gave the government a 48-hour reprieve before implementing the Second Circuit Court's
decision, and then stayed the Second Circuit Court's order preventing the government
from returning the Haitians. McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 3
(1992). On November 30, 1992, the Supreme Court denied the request made by the
Haitians' attorneys to delay the case until Bill Clinton took office. McNary v. Haitian
Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. 593 (1992).
'" In January 1992, the Administration announced the opening of an office in Haiti's
capital to receive applications for admittance to the United States. Steve Marshall, U.S.
Embassy Will ProcessAsylum-Seekers, USA TODAY, Jan. 31, 1992, at 3A. This marked
the first time in history that Haitians have been accepted as refugees into the United
States.
Z4 As one expert has noted:
The idea that people suffering repression and at risk of human rights
violations, at risk of arbitrary detention, at risk of beating, at risk of
torture, and perhaps even death... the idea that such people should
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Further, those in the rural areas, where most of the severe repression
is taking place, have absolutely no way of getting to the capital.
There is also such a high threshold for approval and such extensive
documentary proof required of Haitians, that very few can qualify.149
Accounts of refugee applicants who have been killed seeking proof
of past persecution are documented." With President Bush's
Kennebunkport Order, even the pretense of fairness in dealing with
the Haitian refugees disappeared."'
But lawyers representing the Haitians say fairness had not
been evident for some time. 52 In their briefs to the Court in Haitian
contemplate visiting the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince, should dare
to stroll down the boulevard under the gaze of men in dark glasses
who lounge on street comers, such an idea is ridiculous.
Ian Martin, Secretary General Amnesty International USA, Address at the Annual
Meeting of Amnesty International (June 26, 1992).
"o Haitians lucky enough to make it to the U.S. Embassy will probably be denied
protection. Howard French, Haitian Dissident Loses Plea for U.S. Refugee Visa, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 7, 1993, at All. Of the over 5000 applications for refugee status
submitted thus far, only 179 have been approved. Many Haitians who made it to the
Embassy have already experienced arrests or mistreatment by military authorities.
Nightline: Safety of Returned Haitians Not Being Monitored (ABC television broadcast,
Feb. 24, 1992). Applicants often wait weeks for an appointment or for an answer, often
living in hiding.
's New Evidence of Reprisals Against Returned Refugees, HAM INSIGHT (Nat'l.
Coalition for Haitian Refugees, New York, N.Y.), Fall 1992, at 5. In March 1993, a
soldier who had been granted refugee status in Haiti after he refused to carry out orders
to kill those targeted as pro-Aristide was forcibly taken off an airplane in Port-au-Prince.
Andres Viglucci, For Haitian Deserter, Odyssey Ends Happily, MiAMI HEIIALD, Mar. 25,
1993, at IA. See also Deborah Sontag, Haiti Arrests Man on Way to Asylwn in the
U.S., N.Y. Tns, Mar. 14, 1993, § 1, at 8.
'' According to many Haitian refugee advocates, in issuing the Kennebunkport
Order and easing the economic embargo shortly thereafter, President Bush sent a clear
message to Haiti's de facto government that they could blatantly commit human rights
abuses against the Haitian people and get away with it. Tragically, now that protection
of bona fide Haitian refugees is more important than ever given the level of political
persecution in Haiti, Haitians are being afforded no protection at all.
152 Lawyers for the Haitians in the Baker case maintain that the legal issues took a
back seat to political maneuvering. The State Department and Bush Administration, they
say, did an excellent job of diverting attention away from the legal issues and convincing
the courts and the public that denying the Haitians their legal rights was in the best
interest of everyone. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker,
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
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Refugee Center v. Baker, the Haitians' lawyers argued that
government lawyers manufactured affidavits, rushed courts to
judgment, and deliberately misled the courts with false claims of
national emergency and military necessity."' They point out that on
January 28, 1992, the government filed an emergency petition for a
stay of the ban on repatriations with the Eleventh Circuit, alleging
that 20,000 Haitians "were massed" on the Haitian beaches and
waiting to head for Guantanamo, and that the naval base could not
accommodate such numbers." Three days later, and before the
Eleventh Circuit had ruled, the government went to the Supreme
Court with the same allegations. 55 Attorneys for the Haitians argued
that this was a "self created" crisis and that Guantanamo had a far
greater capacity to hold people than the Administration claimed. 56
The Haitians' attorneys also say that under sworn deposition,
Undersecretary Bernard Aronson admitted that the term "massing"
was ambiguous and retracted his use of the word.157 Contrary to his
statements in his declaration to the Supreme Court, he admitted that
he was quite unsure of the number of Haitians preparing to leave.5 '
Shortly after this incident, the Supreme Court lifted the ban on
Id. at 18-22. The government sent Solicitor General Kenneth W. Staff to argue
its position before the District Court in Miami, although Solicitor Generals usually
appear in person only in particularly important U.S. Supreme Court cases.
"4 Harold Maass & Marjorie Valbrun, Haiti Exodus Prediction Questioned, MIAMI
HERALD, Jan. 31, 1992, at 14A. See generally Plaintiffs' Application to Stay the
Mandates of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Pending
Certiorari at 31-41, Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949 P.2d 1109 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
"' First Refugee Group Arrives Back in Haiti; Process Goes Smoothly, but Many
Fearing Reprisals, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 3, 1992, at Al. See also Plaintiffs'
Application to Stay the Mandates of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit Pending Certiorari at 31-41, Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
"4 See Plaintiffs' Application to Stay the Mandates of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Pending Certiorari at 31-41, Haitian Refugee Ctr. v.
Baker, 949 F.2d 1109 (11th Ci.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
IS7 id.
158 Id.
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repatriations.159 Notwithstanding the government's claim that a mass
exodus was about to begin in January 1992, independent observers,
including the Coast Guard attache in Port-au-Prince who flew over
the Haitian shores of La Gonave, the point of departure for many
Haitians, concluded otherwise.1 60In denying attorneys for the Haitians access to Guantanamo
and the Coast Guard cutters, the government claimed that it would
seriously interfere with military operations."' Judge Atkins noted,
however, the portions of the military base to which the attorneys
sought access were not used for military purposes.1 62 Furthermore,
Coast Guard Admiral William P. Leahy acknowledged in his
deposition that press members, VIPs, and a host of other persons had
access to Guantanamo and he admitted that family members of Coast
Guard members periodically go on Coast Guard cutters, including his
fourteen year old son who spent two weeks on a cutter during a law
enforcement mission.1 63
'3 Id. In their brief to the Supreme Court, lawyers for the Haitians referred to the
government reliance on the declaration of Robert K. Wolthuis, whom the government
presented as the Assistant Secretary Of Defense. Mr. Wolthuis, according to the
Haitians' lawyers, had assumed that position for one day only - the day he signed the
declaration. Mr. Wolthuis readily admitted that most of the facts he swore to in his
declaration were what the lawyers who had drafted it told him. The declaration was so
defective that attorneys for the Haitians filed a separate memorandum concerning it.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19, Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
"o Thousands of Refugees are Forced Back, HAMrl INsIGHT (Nat'l Coalition for
Haitian Refugees, New York, N.Y.), March/April 1992, at 2.
161 See Al Kamen, Large Wave of Boat People Sails from Haiti, WASH. POST, Apr.
16, 1992, at A6. See generally Plaintiffs' Application to Stay the Mandates of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Pending Certiorari at 31-41,
Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245
(1992).
16 Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 789 F. Supp. 1552, 1574 (S.D. Fla. 1991), rev'd,
949 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
"3 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19-20, Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992). This selective denial of access, based on the kind of
message a visitor might bring, prevented those most likely to assist the Haitians from
having access to them. As for the government's claim that not returning the Haitians
would cost millions of dollars, preclude use of Coast Guard cutters for other important
tasks such as drug interdiction, and complicate relations with Cuba because using
Guantanamo might violate the U.S. lease on the base, the District Court noted that much
of the damage feared by the government could be avoided if they followed adequate
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Lawyers working for the Haitians complained that politics,
not the law, was ruling the day. 1" If this is true, then grave concerns
are raised relating to the administration of justice and the integrity of
the judicial process.
Government officials claimed their effort to forcibly return the
Haitians was inspired by the desire to save the lives of those who
would otherwise be encouraged to take to the sea in unworthy vessels
(the so-called "magnet" effect).16 But as Appeals Court Judge
screening procedures, since it could then repatriate Haitians who did not have plausible
claims. Baker, 789 F. Supp. at 1574.
'" Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motions for Temporary Restraining Order and Expedited Discovery, at 9-10, Haitian
Ctr. Council v. McNary, No. 92-1258 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). Perhaps the most bizarre of
these practices involved the Eleventh Circuit Court. On January 31, 1992, it appeared
that the Eleventh Circuit had issued an order overturning Judge Atkin's injunction and
allowing the government to repatriate the Haitians. Four hours later, however, the court
issued a second order saying the first order had been improperly issued because of a
"clerical error." First Refugee Group Arrives Back in Haiti; Process Goes Smoothly, but
Many Fearing Reprisals, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 3, 1992, at Al. The Haitians'
lawyers were then given less than two hours to respond to the government's stay
application to the Supreme Court (the government had stay applications pending before
both the Circuit and the Supreme Court). Later that day, the Supreme Court voted eight
to one to lift the ban on repatriations. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 112 S. Ct. 1245
(1992). The next day, the Circuit Court apparently changed its mind and informed the
Haitians' attorneys that it had issued the order after all, and that there had been no
clerical error. The Eleventh Circuit Court then dismissed the entire case five days later.
Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1992). Lawyers also charged
that summary dismissals on critical decisions were issued, affidavits not a part of the
record were treated as if they were, and key parts of the record were ignored. At one
point Judge Hatchett, the Eleventh Circuit's dissenting judge, felt compelled to claim that
the panel majority was deciding the case under "some procedures here before unknown
to the law" and that "[tihe majority's actions, rulings, and holdings ... are inconsistent
with its actions, holdings, and rulings of two days ago .... " Haitian Refugee Ctr. v.
Baker, 950 F.2d 685, 687 (11th Cir. 1992) (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
'65 Laurence Jolidon, Religious Holiday Gives Haitian Kids Short Break, USA
TODAY, May 29, 1992, at 9A. From day one of the coup, U.S. government officials
were predicting that hundreds of thousands of Haitians would leave their country for the
United States. Once Governor Clinton was elected to office they began predicting the
Haitian exodus would make the Cuban Mariel exodus "look like a picnic." Photos Show
Haitians may be Preparingfor Exodus, UPI, Nov. 14, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File. But about 40,000 Haitians fled their country following the coup up
until Bush's Kennebunkport order, eight months later. Elaine Sciolino, Clinton Says
U.S. Will Continue Ban on Haitian Exodus, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1993, at Al. That
is far less than the 125,000 Cubans who arrived in four months during the Mariel Boat
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Hatchett pointed out: "The primary purpose of the [interdiction]
program was, and has continued to be, to keep Haitians out of the
United States." 16
A look at our treatment of those Haitians who tested positive
for the HIV virus unfortunately supports the argument that we are not
interested in saving the lives of Haitians. In late 1991, United States
government officials began testing the Haitians at Guantanamo for the
HIV virus. 67 Prior to 1992, no person who applied at a border or
in the United States was ever excluded from the asylum program for
being HIV-positive. 168 The 218 HIV-positive Haitians are being
housed at Guantanamo in tin-roofed shacks surrounded by barbed
wire, are denied adequate legal representation, and occasionally suffer
punitive measures handed out without any procedural rights. 169
Lift in 1980. Mike Williams, Will Clinton Trigger a Mariel Boatlift of Haitian
Refugees? Photos ShowBoatsAlready Gathering, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Nov. 21, 1992,
at A2.
'6 Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109, 1112 (11th Cir. 1992) (Hatchett,
J., dissenting). The interdiction program began in 1981, long before the current
immigration wave. Also, the U.S. government has never suggested that we must deter
Cubans from fleeing in order to save their lives, even though according to Coast Guard
officials and Cuban exile leaders, hundreds of rafters will die this year crossing from
Cuba to Miami. Bruce Fein, Blockade of Haitians' Journey to Freedom, LEGAL TIMES,
Feb. 1, 1993, at 32. And what of Haitians risking their lives at home, where very real
threats to safety exist?
" See Lisa Daugaard, Haitians at Guantanamo Say the World has Forgotten Them,
HAITI INSIGHT, (Nat'l Coalition for Haitian Refugees), Fall 1992; Gabriel Rotello, Double
Jeopardy for Haitians, NEwSDAY, Dec. 19, 1991, at 56 (reporting Bush Administration
policy of indefinitely barring Haitians who test HIV-positive).
" According to INS regulations, asylum seekers are not required to subject
themselves to HIV testing until after they have been granted asylum and apply for
residency in the U.S. one year later. Marvine Howe, Aliens Testing Positive for AIDS
are Said to be Giving up on Legislation, N.Y. TMEs, Aug. 18, 1989, at Bi. To this
day, Cubans who are interdicted at the same time and literally in the same boat as
Haitians are immediately transported to the United States and allowed to enter the
asylum program without ever being medically screened for HIV or any other disease.
Anne-Marie O'Connor & Mike Williams, Friends of Haitians Hail End of Immigration
Ban, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 10, 1993, at Cl.
' Mike Doming, The American Way? For Haitian Refugees with HIV, Freedom
is Still Miles Away, Cl1. TRIB., Jan. 25, 1993, at 1. Visitors to the base have repeatedly
confirmed the refugees' reports of military and INS abuses and a group at Guantanamo
has repeatedly said they would rather die than return to Haiti under present political
conditions. Recent suicide attempts are eloquent testimony of this. See Military
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Most in this group have been incarcerated at Guantanamo for
over a year. The INS itself acknowledges their claims of political
persecution in Haiti to be credible.17 ° Furthermore, doctors from
the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) warned the Navy last year
that HIV-positive individuals should not be crowded together in a
camp such as Guantanamo, since this facilitates the spread of
tuberculosis to which they are particularly susceptible. 17 In late
January 1993, 265 "screened-in" Haitian refugees interred at
Guantanamo because they or their family members are HIV-positive
began a hunger strike, vowing to continue until death, despite their
precarious state of health. 1
While President Clinton appeared to be moving to keep his
campaign promise to lift the ban preventing the entry of immigrants
who have tested positive for the HIV virus, the Senate voted
overwhelmingly to stop the Administration from doing this. 7 The
seventy-six to twenty-three vote sent a very clear message that many
Violence Blamed for Haitian Refugee Surge, UPI, Jan. 28, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Omni File.
170 See Greg Henderson, Justices Direct Government to Reply to New Haitian
Charge, UPI, Feb. 11, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. Almost
all those who have gone through refugee screening have met the INS standard for
political asylum in the United States. Yet although the U.S. government has the legal
authority to bring them into the country at any time, they remain in limbo and isolated
from the outside world, with the possibility that they will leave Guantanamo only to go
back to Haiti.
"7 See Marlene Cimons & Melissa Healy, Public Health Threat Cited in Isolation
of ll Haitians, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1992, at Al. In 1990, the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration banned Haitian nationals from donating blood in the U.S. Haitians were
not listed as a high risk group for the HIV virus at the time and the ban was
subsequently lifted. Charles Strouse, Haitians Protest Blood Ban, MIAMI HERALD, Mar.
7, 1990, at lB.
172 Haitian Hunger Strike Enters Fourth Week, UPI, Feb. 19, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. On March 26, 1993, a federal judge in New York
ruled that the United States must either provide the Haitians still at Guantanamo with
adequate medical care at the U.S. naval base or move them elsewhere. During hearings
in New York, the government acknowledged that camp doctors could not adequately take
care of many of the refugees. Aminda Marques Gonzalez, U.S. Told to Treat Haitians
for AIDS, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 27, 1993, at IA. See also Deborah Sontag, Judge
Orders Better Care for Haitians with AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1993, § 1, at 9.
17 Clifford Krauss, Senate Opposes bmigration of People with AIDS Virus, N.Y.
TMES, Feb. 19, 1993, at All.
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Haitian refugee advocates fear will lead to the President backing
down on the issue. 74 Still, President Clinton has the legal authority
to parole the Guantanamo refugees into the United States regardless
of whether the HIV restriction is lifted. 75 Senior Health and Human
Services Department officials, including former Secretary Sullivan,
supported lifting the ban, as have international health authorities. 7 '
VIII. A Critique of United States Policy
The United States government's response to the Haitian
refugee crisis has been an exercise in political cynicism that flouts
international refugee law. The forcible return of Haitians today not
only places at risk many who face serious human rights violations,
but threatens to undermine carefully crafted international
arrangements for the protection of those who flee such violations. 77
The hypocrisy of such a policy is blatant. When President
174 id.
1 7 United States immigration law allows the government to "parole in," for
humanitarian purposes, refugees who are medically excludable. 8 U.S.C. §1182(g)
(1988 & Supp. 1991).
76 Joyce Price, Dropping AIDS Ban Irks Doctors, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1993,
at Al.
"7 Amnesty International summarized the double standard inherent in the U.S.
policy:
The scandal of the U.S. Haitian interdiction policy is not only that
this is being done, but that it is being done by the richest and most
powerful nation on earth. What does this say to the poorer nations
whose people are asked to help the rest of the world's 17 million
refugees camped on their doorstep? What does this say to
Bangledeshees who currently provide refuge to over 200,000 Muslim
refugees fleeing repression in Burma? To Kenyans who continue to
allow in hundreds of Somalis and Sudanese fleeing civil war, adding
to a refugee population to over 400,000? Or indeed, to Iranians who
welcomed over a million Iraqi Kurds and Shiites after the Gulf War
after they had already for years sheltered over 2 million Afghan
refugees?
Ian Martin, Secretary General of Amnesty International USA, Address at the Annual
Meeting of Amnesty International (June 26, 1992).
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Aristide was overthrown in September 1991, United States officials
referred to the outlaw regime in Haiti as a "pariah, without friends,
without support and without a future." 78 All United States citizens
were warned not to travel to Haiti after the coup and all non-
emergency governmental personnel were pulled out of Haiti. 179 Even
the United States Ambassador to Haiti, Alvin Adams, was recalled. 1
Yet the United States insisted on sending the Haitians back. The
message to many was clear -- the lives of Black Haitian refugees are
expendable. They do not count.
A recent report issued by the Washington Office on Haiti
concludes that there was a covert United States strategy to undo the
Aristide Government.181 Indeed, once the threat of Haitians landing
on our shores was realized, United States criticism of the coup
faded."8 Promises by our government to ensure Aristide's return
John M. Goshko, Aristide Seeks OAS Delegation to Confront Haiti Junta Leaders,
WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1991, at Al.
11 Larry Habegger & James O'Reilly, World Travel Watch: Region of Russian
Republic Should be Avoided, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1991, § L, at 6.
"50 Adams was recalled shortly after Rene Theodore, the man nominated to be Haiti's
next Prime Minister, was shot at and nearly killed during OAS talks in Port-au-Prince
in January 1992. U.S. Recalls Envoy From Haiti After Weekend Attack, Reuters, Jan.
27, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. Adams, in fact, had earlier
advised that "Haiti [was] on the verge of an emergency that could surpass any crisis in
the country's recent history." Lee Hockstader, Envoy in Haiti Urges Americans to
Leave; Embargo 'sImpactAwaited; Violence Feared, WASH. PosT, Oct. 23, 1991, at A41.
151 The report stated that a strategy document written by a consultant to the U.S.
embassy surfaced a few weeks after Aristide was overthrown. The document
summarized a progression of steps to delay and eventually deny Aristide's return. It
stated: "What is needed is a comprehensive, sustained and very discrete [sic] approach
to U.S. policy-makers and the U.S. media. More information must be channeled to
them and on a regular basis, and from sources that they will trust and that cannot be
directly traced." Covert Strategy to Undo Aristide Government (Wash. Office on Haiti,
Wash. D.C.), Feb. 8, 1993, at 1.
"s At a hearing held on October 31, 1991, by the House Subcommittee for Western
Hemisphere Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Bernard
Aronson suggested that the government might be considering relaxing Haitian
immigration policy. But he expressed concern that a policy shift might encourage large
numbers of Haitians to attempt a dangerous journey that would lead to their death. Mike
Clary, Haitians Held on Ship as U.S. Reviews Policy, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 6, 1991, at
A17. Indeed, rather than relaxing the Haitian immigration policy in the months that
followed, it was tightened to the point of cutting off all Haitians from relief. The
Haitian immigration policy is worse now than ever. Haitians in genuine fear for their
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carried less conviction as the economic embargo imposed by the
Organization of American States (OAS) fell far short of
accomplishing its goals, and returning the Haitians became the
overriding objective. Critics of United States policy charge that the
United States did not engage in a good-faith attempt to bring the
international community into the forefront of the Haitian dilemma and
failed to genuinely attempt to enforce the economic embargo imposed
by the OAS."' The Bush Administration, faced with the appearance
of inconsistency for condemning the violence of the Haitian military
while asserting that returnees were not facing persecution, reverted
to the familiar refrain that most of the fleeing Haitians are simply
lives cannot escape, not even to other islands in the Caribbean, because the U.S. Coast
Guard will intercept them first.
53 They also charged that the U.S. should have frozen the bank accounts of the coup
leaders and their cronies and denied them visas to come to the United States. Despite
rumored reports that the U.S. planned to unilaterally lift its sanctions on Haiti, President
Bush renewed the measures that would have expired on October 4. But still the trade
embargo imposed by the OAS, which was to force the military to concede power, has
been ignored and undermined at every step. According to a Haitian industrialist on the
anniversary of the coup, "there has never been more gasoline available in Haiti."
Edwige Balutansky, One Year After Coup, Haiti in Poverty, Political Stalemate, Reuters,
Sept. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. A September 21, 1992
report by the General Accounting Office revealed that there had been at least four
petroleum shipments to Haiti between May 30 and September 3, in violation of the OAS
embargo. These shipments originated from the Caribbean island of Aruba. See J.P.
Slavi, Haiti Oil Load May Break Ban, NEWSDAY, Jan. 3, 1992, at 15. Trade has been
so vigorous that U.S. Coast Guard cutters repatriating Haitians have at times found no
room along the Port-au-Prince dock, and have had to bring the Haitians to shore in
rubber rafts. Embargo, Talks Stall; Haiti's Agony Continues, HAITI INSIGHT (Nat'l.
Coalition for Haitian Refugees, New York, N.Y.), Fall 1992, at 3.
While the Bush Administration did not respond to public and editorial pleas
for humanitarian action towards those fleeing persecution and violence in Haiti, it did
respond to the financial burdens of American businessmen with operations in Haiti. On
February 4, 1992, the Bush Administration announced that it would unilaterally lift the
embargo for assembly industries that import parts from the U.S. and re-export assembled
goods to the U.S. Kenneth Freed, U.S. Eases Sanctions Against Haiti; Embargo: Bush
Bows to Pressure fom American Businesses, Angering OAS Leaders, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
5, 1992, at A6. This unilateral action upset members of the OAS, who had unanimously
voted to enforce the embargo in October. Id. In Haiti, the lifting of the embargo was
greeted with glee by those who supported the coup.
314 NYLS JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. X
economic refugees. 1"
In June 1992, Americas Watch and the National Coalition for
Haitian Refugees criticized the skewed United States monitoring of
Haitians repatriated since the coup, alleging it had served a public
relations purpose only and had utterly failed to discover whether
repatriates encounter persecution. 85 Even the 11,000 Haitians who
have been "screened in" since the coup are in real danger of being
denied asylum. Justice Department memorandum186 and public
statements from high-ranking INS officials in recent months reveal a
I" To bolster their case that the Haitians fleeing today are simply economic refugees,
U.S. officials maintain that Haitians are not fleeing to the Dominican Republic. But the
UNHCR and others have reported this is not the case. In fact, Haitians have fled to the
Dominican Republic in large numbers since the coup, despite the large Macoute presence
and the persecution of Haitians there. Between June and September 1991, authorities
from the Dominican Republic summarily ousted as many as 6000 Haitians and
Dominicans of Haitian origin. Report Criticizes D.R. Forced Labor, Deportations, HAm
INsioHT (Nat'l. Coalition for Haitian Refugees, New York, N.Y.), Fall 1992, at 6.
Haitians have received scarce hospitality in the Dominican Republic, where the graffiti
reads "Haitians Out." Human rights experts and refugee advocates estimate that 25,000
Haitians have crossed the border into the Dominican Republic since September 30, 1991.
Michele Wucker, Refugees'Life in Hiding Just Across the Border, NEWSDAY, July 31,
1992, at 15.
0 AmEwaAsA WATH & NAiThAL CQunm1 IVR HAmAN RHRc , HAlF Tm SIORY: Tm
SKEWED U.S. MoNTroRINo OF REPATRIATED HAITIAN REFUGEES (1992). Even as State
Department spokesman Richard Boucher was announcing plans to close the Guantanamo
camp, he admitted there had been renewed political repression in Haiti. Laurence
Jolidon, Religious Holiday Gives Haitian Kids Short Break, USA TODAY, May 29, 1992,
at 9A.
' As reported in a 1992 National Asylum Study Project, the Justice Department's
Asylum Policy and Review Unit (APRU) has taken special interest in the Haitians from
Guantanamo. The preliminary assessments that each asylum officer sends to APRU
included a special cover sheet, identifying them as Haitian cases from Guantanamo Bay.
In 33 of the first 43 assessments, asylum officers recommended to grant asylum. APRU
recommended reversal of 18 of these assessments to grant and reversal of only one
assessment to deny. Special incentives were given to asylum officers to deny these
cases. "INS could be encouraged to . . .[count] a completed denial as a double case
completion and a completed grant as a simple case completion for purposes of their
internal [illegible] and officer evaluation." Memorandum from Jan C. Ting, Director,
Asylum Policy and Review Unit & Kristen A. Giuffreda, Assistant Director, Asylum
Policy and Review Unit to Rex J. Ford, Associate Deputy Attorney General 3 (May 26,
1992) (on file with the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights).
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vested interest in labelling these Haitians to be economic refugees.187
While there is no denying that Haiti is the poorest country in the
Western hemisphere, or that almost every Haitian who comes to the
United States will be exposed to a better standard of living, that alone
does not mean Haitians are not politically persecuted in Haiti and
therefore not entitled to asylum.
The Bush Administration's handling of the Haitian refugee
crisis is a striking contrast to the Cuban freedom flotillas in the early
1960s1 and United States' handling of the Vietnamese in the
1970s. 189 As recently as last year, the United States vehemently
criticized the forced return by the British Hong Kong of the
Vietnamese Boat People.'"
United States relations with Haiti over the years bears
mention. There has been little or no opportunity for the development
of democracy in Haiti, in large part due to American domination
which was first established in 1915 when United States Marines
began a nineteen year occupation 'of the country.191 During the
Duvalier family era, the United States supported their rule."9
187 One high-ranking INS official made public statements that 90% of these Haitian
cases would be denied. Immigration and Naturalization Service Deputy Commissioner
Ricardo Inzunza, Remarks at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts
University (Jan. 1992). This statement came before asylum officers had interviewed
many applicants. Similar reports of comments from other high ranking officials have
been made.
' Between 1959 and 1962, over 200,000 Cubans came to the United States in an
organized airlift. Reginald Stuart, Three Years Later, Most Cubans of Boatlift Adjusting
to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1983, at Al.
I" In 1979, President Carter asked Congress for $555 million for the resettlement
of refugees, many fleeing from the Communist regime in Vietnam. See Juan de Onis,
Policy Shift Urged by Refugee Official, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1980, § 1, at 25.
'oHaitian Refugees Sent Back Without Interview, Nat'l Public Radio, May 27, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. And although the United States has been
very critical of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries for their exit visa
requirements, the U.S. has, in fact, supported the Haitian government's exit visa
requirement. Symposium, Conference on International Human Rights Law in State and
Federal Courts, 17 U.S.F. L. REv. 1, 51-52 (1982).
191 See Bruce McCabe, A Close Look at Troubled Haiti, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 29,
1992, at 80.
"9 Id. After Duvalier fled Haiti, lawyers in Miami filed a lawsuit against him and
his sidekicks and a Federal District Court in Miami found that they had pilfered over
$500 million in aid meant for the Haitian people. While this money to date has not been
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"Money, weapons, and training flowed from Washington to the
Haitian National Palace." 193
Even with glaring evidence of abuses committed by the
Duvaliers, United States economic support continued. One week
after jailing almost every opponent of Jean Claude Duvalier's
government, Haitian officials sat down with representatives from the
United States and other Western countries which were the primary
donors to the Duvalier coffers. ' " Haiti continued to receive about
137 million dollars in multi-lateral and bi-lateral aid, and the United
States remained by far the largest contributor to the Haitian budget. 195
United States aid continued to flow despite the fact that the Haitian
government violated every promise they made to the United States in
accepting aid.'" Development experts state that the bottom line of
collected, the decision in this case indicates the extent to which U.S. financial support
to Haiti was misused. See $500 Million Judgment Issued Against Duvaliers, Cm. TRUB.,
Jan. 21, 1988, at 4.
m Peter A. Schey, The Black Boat People, 9 MRATION TODAY7, 8 (1981); Clifford
Krauss, In Policy Shift, U.S. Criticizes Haitian on Rights Abuses, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 7,
1991, at Al. It is generally believed that support for the Duvalier regime had two
purposes. First, foreign policy strategists were concerned that the Caribbean,
traditionally an American stronghold, was being converted into a Marxist sea. This was
viewed as important because more than half of America's oil imports travel the sea lanes
past the Caribbean islands. Thus, the argument was to maintain close ties with the
Duvalier regime and to avoid doing anything which might strain that relationship,
thereby rejecting the asylum claims of Haitian refugees. Schey, supra, at 5. See also
Carl J. Migdail, Powder Keg at Our Doorstep, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., May 19,
1980, at 21. Second, there was general concern over protection of U.S. investment in
the Caribbean and Central America, which totalled billions. See Caribbean Chiefs
Praise Trade Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1983, § 1, at 23.
'" See John Bartram, Conference, Reuters, Aug. 31, 1981, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Omni File; Peter A. Schey, The Black Boat People, 9 MIGRATION TODAY
7, 10 (1981).
' Peter A. Schey, The Black Boat People, 9 MIRATION TODAY 7, 10(1981). See
also Jo Thomas, Duvalier Defends Arrests, Warns Haiti Won't Tolerate Interference,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1980, at A6.
"I See Art Harris, More Money for Public Relations; Polishing Paradise's Tarnished
Image; Haiti, Pressed to Solve Social Problems, Spends to Polish Image, WASH. POST,
Dec. 25, 1981, at Al. For decades, the United States has had a policy of appeasing
Haitian leaders with poor human rights records. One commentator noted:
While [President] Kennedy wished to remove Duvalier or bring
about radical improvements in his methods of rule, he feared
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foreign assistance to Haiti has meant somewhat less hunger for the
poor but above all more prosperity for the ruling families in the
Duvalier dynasty.197
Historically, Haitian refugees have had few powerful
supporters in Washington. However, in light of the obvious harsh
treatment meted out to the Haitians since the coup in Haiti, both
Republicans and Democrats have spoken out on behalf of the
Haitians.198 Still, not enough members of Congress were willing to
creating a "second Cuba" in the Western Hemisphere. Hoping to
ensure a stable, friendly government as a successor to Duvalier, the
Kennedy administration, in the words of Secretary of State Dean
Rusk, "used persuasion, aid, pressure and almost all techniques short
of the landing of outside forces" to bring about changes in Haiti.
Such pressures included nearly a total cut off of American economic
and military aid, withdrawal of the American Ambassador from Port-
au-Prince, and secret funding of Haitian exile groups; and there were
ties between U.S. intelligence agencies and the exile groups that
invaded Haiti in 1963. However, Duvalier was able to exploit his
position as a military and political ally of the U.S. in a broadening
hemispheric campaign against Castro to avert an open breach until
the end of Kennedy's term. U.S. ostracism of Haiti therefore was
short lived. President Johnson moderated the policy of economic
and diplomatic sanctions of Haiti and adopted a less critical stance
toward Duvalier. In the years that followed, official and unofficial
support of the Haitian regime grew, though no evidence was
presented that Duvalier had ceased his campaign of repression.
GL D. LAoiFR] & JoHN A. SCANLN, CAtJIATED KINmm REHRxm AND Aa aEtA'S HALF
OPEN DOOR, 1945 TO THE PRESENT 79 (1986).
,9 Peter A. Schey, The Black Boat People, 9 MIORATION TODAY 7, 10 (1981).
I There have been two major hearings in Congress on the Haitian issue in the past
few years, resulting in much criticism of the U.S. government's Haitian policy.
Members of the Congressional Black Caucus, often referring to the Haitian policy as
racist, have blasted the Administration. At the most recent hearing in November 1991
it was said:
If we can spend $65 billion to free Kuwait, offer up a $1 billion aid
package to feed the people of our former enemies in the Soviet
Union, why can we not open our hearts and share the burden of the
Haitian refugees? During the civil war in Nicaragua, we financed
the Contras and accepted thousand of them onto our shores. We
have accepted into this country, rightly, 20,000 Soviet Jews within
the last year. Why can we not assist these, the most desperate
people in our hemisphere?
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act in a timely fashion to effectively support Haitian refugees. Even
with Republican backing they came up short.'"
Lacking the political clout of their Cuban counterparts,
Haitian refugees and their advocates suffered one final blow under the
102d Congress in early October 1992, when legislation to reverse
President Bush's Kennebunkport order failed to reach a vote of the
full Congress. H.R. 5360, sponsored by Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.)
and co-sponsored by a handful of representatives including two
Republicans, never got the needed widespread backing from the
Democratically-controlled Congress that would have been necessary
to challenge the Bush policies. 2'
Even a bill supporting Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for
Haitians did not pass.2"' Congress created TPS precisely to help
refugees facing the kind of political crisis the Haitians are facing
Cuban and Haitian Immigration, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1991) (statement of Rep.
Rangel).
But it was not only the Black members of Congress who were angered by the
forced repatriation of Haitians. In a letter to Attorney General William Barr written on
April 15, 1992, and signed by 11 U.S. Senators of both parties, the Senators wrote, "we
are greatly concerned by the disregard of this nation's legal duty not to forcibly
repatriate any refugee who has a well-founded fear of persecution." Letter from Sen.
Levin et al. to Attorney General William Barr 1 (Apr. 15, 1992) (on file with the New
York Law School Journal of Hwnan Rights).
19 Florida Senator Connie Mack, a Republican, has been one of the most outspoken
critics of the Administration's Haitian policy, calling it "morally wrong" and "a
disgrace." Larry Rohter, Haven for Haitians Backed in Miami, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5,
1992, at AS. U.S. Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen at one point also called the
nation's Haitian immigration policy an "unfair situation." Sharony Andrews, Lawmaker
Joins Movement to Help Haitian Immigrants, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 21, 1991, at 3B.
I Given the failure of several broader Haiti-focused bills to progress during 1992,
H.R. 5360 sought only to make explicit the U.S. obligation under international law not
to forcibly return political refugees found at sea as well as within U.S. territory. H.R.
5360, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). President Bush had threatened to veto any bill
protecting the Haitians that passed Congress. See Supreme Court Rejects Halt of Haitian
Repatriation, STAR TRIB., Feb. 25, 1992, at 4A.
20 Christopher Marquis, Some Link Rise in Haitian Refugees to Anticipation of
Clinton, MIAMI HEIALD, Nov. 2, 1992, at 6A. The Attorney General is authorized to
grant Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to nationals if "the Attorney General finds that
there exist extraordinary and temporary conditions in the foreign state that prevent aliens
who are nationals of the state from returning to the state in safety. ." 8 U.S.C. §
1254a (b)(1)(C) (1988).
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today.2 2 This status has been granted to numerous other refugee
groups in recent months, including the Kuwaitis, 2° Lebanese, 204
Liberians, 25 and Somalians. 2° Before the Supreme Court gave the
government permission to repatriate the Haitians from Guantanamo,
the government argued there was no need for TPS for Haitians
because a fair screening process was in place to ensure identification
of bona fide refugees. 2 7 Those in need of protection were being
protected, they argued. This is clearly no longer the case. 208
Without TPS, hundreds of thousands of Haitians will be returned to
the danger of persecution and possibly death. 2 9 Our failure to grant
2 See Bruce Fein, Blockade of Haitians' Journey to Freedom, LEGAL TIMES, Feb.
1, 1993, at 32.
' Nation in Brief; Washington D.C.; 'Protected Status' Urged for Haitians, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 1992, at AO.
Id.
wsid.
' Ashley Dunn, ThousandsApp y for U.S. Haven as Deadline Nears, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 31, 1991, at BI. It has been suggested that on the one hand, the U.S. is a "beacon
and a haven" for those less fortunate, but on the other hand, this nation cannot have a
completely open-door policy. A bill that would temporarily suspend the repatriation of
Haitians strikes a good balance between the two ideals. The concerns about such a bill
having a magnet effect have an irrational foundation because any such bill has a cut-off
point which would counteract that effect.
7 See Jim Lobe, Haiti: Horrifying Human Rights Situation, Reports Group, Inter
Press Service, Dec. 9, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
' The situation today in Haiti is clearly worse than under the Duvaliers. The
military is targeting anyone and anything that can give hope to the Haitians. See THE
AILA HUMAN RIGnm DmmtArio RFoRT ON HAIT (Mar. 1993); AmNan'Y bErmTIAL,
HAITI, HUMAN R Im HEL RANSOM (Aug. 1992); AMERICS WATI, REmN TO THE DARCEsr
DAYS; HUMAN RiuHTs IN HAM SINCE THE COUP (Dec. 30, 1991). One U.S. consular
official remarked that each time he visited the morgue in Port-au-Prince it was filled to
capacity and most of the bodies had bullet wounds. Even nuns have been arrested for
carrying calendars that bear Aristide's picture. See AMERICAS WATCH, supra, at 13. A
report issued by a United Nations investigator on February 25, 1993, found that "the
human rights situation in Haiti has degenerated appreciably during 1992 and in Haiti
today there is virtually no rule of law." Michael Tarr, Funeral for Drowned Haitians
Becomes Protest Against Rule, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1993, at A26.
2 Sources in Port-au-Prince said detentions resumed in October 1992, largely due
to the upturn in interdiction and the fact that there has been much less attention from the
press. According to these sources, 164 Haitians repatriated in late October were put on
two buses and brought to police headquarters. New Evidence of Reprisals Against
Returned Refugees, HAM INSIGHT (Nat'l. Coalition for Haitian Refugees, New York,
N.Y.), Fall 1992, at 5. Under international law, the United States is the country of first
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TPS to the Haitians prevents us from ever again insisting that other
countries provide safe haven to fleeing refugees.210
Although in 1991 every major newspaper in the country
condemned the Administration's Haitian policy in editorials, one even
calling the Bush policy "Operation Racist Shield," ' recent polls
suggest that a great percentage of Americans agree with the
Administration's policy of keeping Haitians out.212  Since Bill
Clinton's election as president and subsequent claims by the Bush
Administration that there will be a mass exodus of Haitians to our
country should the Haitian policy change, making Mariel "look like
a picnic,"213 the perceived call for change in the treatment of Haitians
has faded.21 4 Indeed, recent polls in Florida have shown people are
asylum for Haitians. That imposes greater obligations on the U.S. and requires this
nation to admit these individuals, at least temporarily, until their safety can be assured.
Ana Puga, Critics Blast U.S. Haitian Refugee Policy, Hous. CHRON., May 31, 1992, at
20.
20 Not surprisingly, Ethiopians, Black refugees not unlike the Haitians, have faced
similar problems in obtaining TPS. The previous Administration sought to revoke
Extended Voluntary Departure, the protected status in place before TPS, for Ethiopians
with no explanation for the change in policy. Only through the bipartisan efforts of the
Black Caucus were the Ethiopians able to retain that protection. Joanne Omang, Policy
Change Will Let Exiled Ethiopians in U.S., WASH. POST, July 8, 1982, at A3.
2 Operation Racist Shield, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 2, 1992, at 2C.
212 See Clinton's Haitian Headache; India's Abdication of Authority, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., Jan. 25, 1993, at 16 ("only 25% of Americans favor granting asylum to
Haitian refugees.").
213 Photos Show Haitians May be Preparing for Exodus, UPI, Nov. 14, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. At the same time politicians in South
Florida were screaming about the prospects of another Mariel and U.S. inability to
handle any further crisis as a result of Hurricane Andrew, the Greater Miami Chamber
of Commerce hosted a two-day conference, attended by federal, state, county, and city
officials, to develop a working plan for absorbing hundreds of thousands of Cuban
refugees should Castro fall. Miami Ready if Castro Falls, UPI, Jan. 8, 1993, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
214 In July 1991, the Miami community protested the treatment of Haitian refugees.
An old wooden boat overloaded with 161 Haitians came upon two Cubans bobbing on
an inner tube raft. The Haitians rescued the Cubans and steered towards Miami. The
U.S. Coast Guard stopped the boat, offering refuge to the two Cubans in Miami and
returning the Haitians back to Haiti. Jim Loney, Summer Exodus Shows Different
Policies on Haitians, Cubans, Reuters, June 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File. Two days later, five Haitian "stowaways" arrived in Miami
onboard a Honduran freighter. The captain, warned by INS that he would be
responsible should the Haitians escape before the ship left, put the Haitians in chains and
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now adamantly opposed to relaxing the Haitian policy.215
While anti-immigrant and anti-refugee groups have not gained
nearly as much strength in the United States as in other parts of the
world,216 rising xenophobia here is a problem.217 The Haitians are
clearly not welcome in the United States today.2 ' They are instead,
in the words of the Reverend Jesse Jackson, "trapped between the
tyranny at home and the abandonment and rejection of the American
people." 219
cages on the deck of the ship at the peak of a summer day. Conjuring up images of
slavery, the incident prompted outcry in Little Haiti and beyond. Kimberly Crockett &
Harold Maass, Crew Puts Haitians in Chains and Cage, MIAMI HERALD, July 12, 1991,
at lB.
2"S A public opinion poll conducted by the Miami Herald and a local Miami
television station in December 1991 revealed that 57% of Florida residents believed that
Haitians should be allowed to stay in the United States until it was safe to return to
Haiti. Elizabeth Grudzinski, Bush, Florida Split on Haitians; 57% in State Poll Favor
Letting Refugees Stay - For Now, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 13, 1991, at 1A. However, a
Mason Dixie poll conducted about six months later, from May 29-31, 1992, indicated
that Florida voters overwhelmingly felt the U.S. could not afford to let the Haitians in
and concluded they were simply economic refugees. See Lizette Alvarez, Florida Split
on Haiti Policy, MIAMI HERALD, June 5, 1992, at IA.
216 See, e.g., Unrest Ted to East German Secret Police, USA TODAY, Sept. 4, 1992,
at 4A.
217 After President Clinton's election, the Federation for American Immigration
Reform (FAIR) placed advertisements on radio stations in South Florida, imploring
concerned citizens to write to Clinton and urge him not to reverse the Bush
Administration's policy of forced repatriation of interdicted Haitians without any type
of screening. Lisa Ocker, Radio Ads Call For Clinton Not to Accept Haitians, SUN
SENTINEL, Dec. 8, 1992, at 4B.
215 It has been suggested that the media has played a role in influencing public
opinion. One recent report indicated that newspaper stories in four major American
newspapers "systematically distorted the human rights record of President Aristide while
underplaying the terror practiced by the coup government." The Press and Haiti:
Systematic Distortions and Omissions, September 1991 - June 1992, HAITI
COMMUNICATIONS PROJEc (Boston Media Action, Somerville, Mass.), Feb. 1993, at 1.
The four newspapers evaluated were the New York Tunes, the Boston Globe, the
Washington Post, and the Miami Herald. Id.
219 Cheryl Little, Haitians Still Singled Out for Discrimination, MIAMI HERALD, Aug.
26, 1990, at 7F. The City of Miami agreed in early February 1993 to pay $650,000 to
56 Haitians who allegedly were beaten by police during a 1990 demonstration. Under
the agreement, the city does not admit any guilt in the case. Television footage from the
day of the demonstration shows protestors being beaten and at least five bloody Haitians
being carried away. Charles Strouse, Miami Will Pay $650,000 in Clubbings; 56 Sued
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IX. Conclusion
To no other people except the Haitians does the United States
give not just its back, but the back of its hand.22 To no other people
does the American political establishment say: "We have placed an
economic embargo against those who usurped your government, but
we will not let you flee its consequences. "22
Although while running for office President Clinton strongly
criticized President Bush's Haitian policy as illegal and inhumane,222
the extent of his commitment to bring about real change in Haiti has
After Clash with Police in 1990, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 6, 1993, at 1A.
I The INS and the State Department even cast doubts on the motives of Haitians
who are now U.S. residents. Contrary to other resident aliens who might lose their
residency documents when traveling outside of the U.S., Haitians are submitted to more
demanding rules when they apply for a temporary "letter of transportation" that allows
them back into the U.S. To obtain this letter, Haitians must show proof of their identity.
Increasingly, the only proof that U.S. Consular officers will allow must come directly
from the INS. Acquiring it can take months. INS' Bias Beat Goes On, MIAMI HERALD,
June 12, 1991, at 22A. Similarly, Haitians applying in Port-au-Prince for U.S. visas on
the basis of family preference are being denied entrance if their medical bills in the
United States have not been completely paid, even if ongoing payment arrangements
acceptable to care providers have been made. It appears that only Haitians are
encountering this problem - of six U.S. consulates in Latin America that the Miami
Herald was able to reach, all said they did not inquire about unpaid medical bills, or any
kinds of debts. Lizette Alvarez, Hospital Bills Bar Haitians From U.S., Advocates
Charge, MIAMI HERALD, July 14, 1991, at 1A. The U.S. embassy policy has split up
families, torn U.S.-born children away from their homes, and placed additional financial
burdens on relatives who remain here. Many of the Haitians being denied visas are
women. Most have never accepted cash assistance in the past, and many have family
willing to support them until they find jobs. William Booth, 'We're the Perfect
Americans ' South Florida's Haitians Build Proud, Vigorous Community, WASH. POST,
Feb. 8, 1992, at Al.
22 Stop Haitian Interdiction!, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 20, 1991, at 18A.
" On May 27, 1992, President Clinton stated: "I am appalled by the decision of
the Bush Administration to pick up fleeing Haitians on the high seas and forcibly return
them to Haiti before considering their claim to political asylum. This process must not
stand." Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; The Two Clintons, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22,
1993, at A17. When the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the
Bush policy violated the Refugee Act of 1980, Mr. Clinton said the court was "right"
to overturn the "cruel policy of returning Haitian refugees to a brutal dictatorship
without an asylum hearing." Id. On November 12, 1992, shortly after Mr. Clinton was
elected president, he stated: "We should have a process in which these Haitians have
a chance to make their case." Id.
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been questioned. 2' His failure upon taking office to rescind the Bush
Administration's policy of returning Haitian boat people without any
inquiry as to why they fled has disappointed many. Indeed, the
Clinton Administration defended the Bush Policy before the Supreme
Court. The United States Supreme Court heard oral argument on the
legality of President Bush's order on March 8, 1993. The United
States Government asked the Court to leave undisturbed the
President's assertion of authority in this "sensitive area of military
operations and foreign policy." 2I A decision is expected by the
summer.
However, it appears that President Clinton is making a greater
effort to assure President Aristide's return than did President Bush.
President Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher recently
raised the possibility of tightening sanctions against Haiti,2 5 although
the President refused to set a date for Aristide's return, as Aristide
requested. 2' In mid-February 1993, a UN envoy stated that Haiti's
army and military-based government agreed to the deployment of
The January 1993 announcement by the head of the U.S. Coast Guard of a virtual
blockade around Haiti to keep refugee boats from reaching South Florida further
unnerved many Haitian refugee advocates. At least 17 patrol boats and cutters and about
a dozen airplanes and helicopters began guarding the 12 mile territorial limit of Haiti's
western and northern coasts. Several Navy ships were expected to join the Coast Guard
vessels. Andres Viglucci, U.S. Barricading Haiti Flotilla of Boats, Aircraft on Way,
MmAiu HERALD, Jan. 16, 1993, at IA. Many cynically remark that while the U.S. was
unable to enforce the economic embargo imposed on Haiti, they are confident the
blockade of Black Haitian boat people will be effective.
24 Brief for Petitioner at 13, Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d
Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992) (No. 92-344).
I Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Avoid a Bloodbath in Haiti: Declare a Deadline, N.Y.
TIES, Mar. 16, 1993, at A21; Rights Monitors Face Limited Role in Haiti, Cm. TRiB.,
Feb. 10, 1993, at A3. President Clinton recently appointed two special envoys to Haiti
to assist in returning democracy to Haiti. Critics contend that such action falls far short
of President Clinton's campaign pledge of abandoning U.S. policy of forcibly returning
Haitians picked up at sea. Thomas L. Friedman & Elaine Sciolino, Clinton and Foreign
Issues: Spasms of Attention, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 22, 1993, at A3.
I President Clinton met with Jean-Bertrand Aristide on March 16, 1993, but refused
to set a date by which Washington would demand Aristide's return to power. Gwen
Ifill, Haitian is Offered Clinton's Support on an End to Exile, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 17,
1993, at Al.
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international civilian observers in Haiti. 2 7
While our borders cannot, of course, be open to everyone,
they are meant to be open to people fleeing precisely the kind of
political violence of which Haitians are now the victims. The way to
insure the safety of Haitians is not to blockade them from leaving,
but to provide a more secure departure mechanism for those who fear
political persecution. As long as the political reality of Haiti does not
change, we can expect desperate Haitians to attempt to escape.228
Ignoring the problem facing those in Haiti today will not make the
problem disappear. Only a commitment to address Haiti's real
problems will. 9
"Bondye Bon" (God is good) is a common Haitian saying.Y0
One can only hope that the Haitians' implicit faith in goodness will
one day be recognized and that the discriminatory treatment of
Haitian refugees will finally end. As has recently been remarked of
the Haitians: "These people are not our enemies; they do not deserve
to be treated as such." 23
1
Don Bohning, Haiti Observers; A Glimmer of Hope, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 18,
1993, at 20A.
I Despite public perception that those fleeing will drain our resources, various
studies conducted in Florida have found that the Haitian community is amazingly self-
sufficient. The Haitians generally do not apply for public benefits and given the
opportunity, quickly become self-supporting. Julian L. Simon, Fleeing Haitians Deserve
a Chance, Cm. TRn., May 2, 1992, at 21.
2 According to Haitian refugee advocates, the new Administration must effectively
communicate with President Aristide and intensify direct U.S. pressure to help restore
Aristide's democratically elected government. An invigorated U.N. effort to persuade
Haiti's military rulers to cede power is also necessary, they say, as is a tightening of the
OAS' embargo of Haiti. See Don Bohning, A Window of Opportunity Opens in Haiti,
MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 24, 1993, at 22A; Andres Oppenheimer, Haiti's Disappearing
Forests, Cm. TRIB., July 1, 1992, at 8.
0 Haitians often use this particular saying when talking about their problems or
explaining a difficult situation. It implies complete trust that if one tries hard, in the end
good will prevail.
2"1 Yale University Law School Lowenstein Clinic, Draft Report, Summary of
Current Plight of Haitian Refugees in Light of the Supreme Court Decision to Bar Access
to Counsel, May 1, 1992, at 5.
